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Introduction 
Several studies contend that humans are the weakest link in computer security, given that 
humans often engage in non-secure computer practices with non-malicious intentions.  
(Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu, & Benbasat, 2010; Chen, Ramamurthy, & Wen, 2012; D'Arcy & Hovav, 
2007; Sasse, Brostoff, & Weirich, 2001).   Non-malicious security violations (NMSVs) such as 
failure to recognize phishing emails, use of weak passwords, development of non-secure 
program code, and failure to comply with computer security policies, all pose a threat to 
computer security in the form of human error (Guo, Yuan, Archer, & Connelly, 2011; Willison 
& Warkentin, 2013).  A recent report by IBM (2014) contends that more than 95% of computer 
security incidents include some aspect of human error, while a recent report by PwC (2015) 
states that human error contributed to 50% of the single worst data breaches in 2015, an increase 
of 31% over the previous year.  NMSVs are acknowledged to represent human behavior separate 
from that predicated by malicious intent, with individuals engaged in malicious human behavior 
sometimes referred to as hackers, bad actors or malicious insiders (Wang, Gupta, & Rao, 2015),  
Given the modern day need for organizations to maintain uninterrupted access to information 
systems (IS) to achieve organizational objectives, human error represents a reverse salient within 
computer security defense-in-depth architectures due to the vulnerability it creates (Acuña, 2016; 
Dedehayir & Mäkinen, 2011; Guo et al., 2011; Hughes, 1983).     
 
As a countermeasure to the vulnerability of human error in computer security, some studies 
contend that developing and maintaining a culture of computer security is essential for managing 
the human, or behavioral aspect of computer security (Da Veiga & Eloff, 2007; Dhillon, Syed, & 
Pedron, 2016; van Niekerk & von Solms, 2010; B. von Solms, 2000).  Schein (2004) confirms 
this contention by stating that culture is an abstraction, and that organizations need to understand 
the forces that result from social and organizational situations, lest they fall victim to them.  
 
One aspect of computer security culture is human compliance with computer security policy 
(Thomson & von Solms, 2005).  Several studies have published findings on the effects of a 
computer security policy on computer security culture and compliance with computer security 
policy.  Da Veiga and Eloff (2007) contend that a culture of computer security is developed 
through actions taken by an organization, and that these actions include the implementation and 
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governance of information security policies.  D’Arcy & Hovav (2007) posit that a culture of 
computer security that encourages compliance with security policies, user security awareness, 
and attention to security issues, will help reduce information system misuse in the workplace.  
Knapp, Marshall, Rainer, & Ford (2006) contend that support from top management positively 
impacts computer security culture and policy enforcement.  Bulgurcu et al. (2010), along with 
Safa, von Solms, & Furnell (2016), contend that information security awareness can positively 
influence individual beliefs regarding computer security policies, suggesting that creation of a 
computer security culture improves computer security.  Conversely, Y. Chen, Ramamurthy, & 
Wen (2015) contend that just being aware of a computer security policy contributes little to 
computer security culture, while   Y. Chen et al. (2012) posit that employees require both 
positive and negative reinforcement to follow security policies and procedures in order to 
produce desired human behavior.   
 
Thus, it is a premise of this study that human compliance with computer security policy is an 
element of computer security culture that contributes to managing the human aspect of computer 
security (S. H. von Solms, 2005).   For this to be true, it is posited that an enterprise must have an 
overarching computer security policy that is comprehensive in scope and ownership, against 
which all impacted humans can be held compliant.  However, no studies have been found that 
explain the impact of a comprehensive computer security policy on human computer security 
compliance through an understanding of its direct or indirect effects.   
 
For purpose of this study, a comprehensive computer security policy is defined as a top-level 
enterprise policy incorporating all aspects of enterprise computer security encompassing 
information technology (IT) computer security and operational technology (OT) computer 
security,  as opposed to only one domain or the other.  The concept of merging IT computer 
security which is focused on information systems security, with that of OT computer security 
which is focused on industrial control systems security, is sometimes referred to as IT/OT 
convergence and reflects a holistic approach to managing enterprise computer security (ISACA, 
2016).  This definition of a comprehensive computer security policy differs from the traditional 
definition of a computer security policy that only includes aspects of a computer security 
program from the IT domain, as this definition also includes all aspects of a computer security 
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program from the OT domain.  As such, a comprehensive computer security policy encompasses 
all enterprise aspects of computer security thereby incorporating enterprise scope and ownership 
of computer security into a single, overarching policy that binds all humans in the enterprise to a 
common cause.  In doing so, the issue of human error is addressed through human compliance 
with a shared, comprehensive computer security policy which in turn is aligned with Schein’s 
(2004)  formal definition of organizational culture; “a pattern of shared basic assumptions that 
was learned by a group as it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, 
that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members 
as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems.”    
 
It is the comprehensive nature of the computer security policy that separates this study from 
similar studies in this research domain.  Therefore, it is the thesis of this study that a 
comprehensive computer security policy has a direct effect on human compliance with computer 
security policy, which can be further explained through indirect effects.   
 
Motivation   
It is not well known how a comprehensive computer security policy effects human compliance 
with computer security policy, as a literature review resulted in no studies found on this topic.  
This finding represents a gap in IS literature, as any computer security policy to which humans 
are held accountable should be explainable in regard to the factors that influence human 
compliance with that policy.  This finding provides the motivation for this study. 
 
It is a premise of this study that human compliance with computer security policy is an element 
of computer security culture that contributes to managing the human, or behavioral aspect of 
computer security.  In addition, it is posited that such a policy must be overarching and 
comprehensive in terms of scope and ownership, against which all impacted humans can be held 
compliant.  As defined by this study, a computer security policy must be comprehensive in scope 
in order to have a meaningful effect on human compliance with computer security policy.  This 
study defines a comprehensive computer security policy as a top-level policy incorporating all 
aspects of computer security including research, control selection, tool selection, monitoring, 
incident response, and training and awareness practices from both the IT and OT domains.  A 
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logical reference to the distinction between the IT domain and the OT domain is that described 
by the Reference Model for Computer Integrated Manufacturing (CIM), wherein the separation 
between the IT domain and the OT domain can be paraphrased as the point of demarcation 
between computer decision support systems leveraged by humans (IT),  and  computer industrial 
control systems that make control decisions autonomously (OT)  (CIM Reference Model 
Committee International Purdue Workshop on Industrial Computer Systems, 1989).   
Recognition of this distinction, and the effect of joining both domains into a comprehensive 
computer security policy, is critical to understanding the premise of this thesis.   
 
Enterprise computer risk is not limited to the computing infrastructure situated in the IT domain 
alone.  Enterprise computer risk exists in the OT domain as well and is growing, due to the 
expanding presence of computers being embedded in devices beyond the IT desktop computer 
and IT laptop computer.  Computing technology is rapidly becoming embedded in modern 
electronic devices such as cell phones, tablets, navigation devices, wearable gadgets, and 
industrial control components, thereby increasing enterprise vulnerability to modern computer 
threats (US-CERT Publications, 2015). The recent realization of the Internet, the World Wide 
Web, and the Internet of Things (IoT) has enabled the introduction of a new era of computer 
threats that are unprecedented in scale and scope, and continue to show signs of rapid evolution.   
 
Labeled variously as the IoT, the industrial Internet of Things (IIoT), or simply embedded 
systems, the IoT has been identified by the National Intelligence Council as one of six disruptive 
technologies with the power to spread IT risk far more widely than the Internet has to date 
(National Intelligence Council, 2008).  Thus, a computer security policy encompassing enterprise 
IT and enterprise OT establishes the foundation for a holistic, or comprehensive scope of 
enterprise computer security culture. 
 
As defined by this study, a computer security policy must be comprehensive in ownership in 
order to have a meaningful effect on human compliance with computer security policy.  This 
study defines comprehensive ownership as clear accountability for an overarching computer 
security policy, with the ability to delegate responsibility as deemed necessary.  Clearly defined 
ownership at the top of the organization sets the tone for developing and maintaining a 
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comprehensive culture of computer security across an enterprise. Clearly defined ownership sets 
the foundation for enterprise computer security by recognizing the difference between IT and 
OT, which in turn establishes the foundation for a comprehensive computer security policy.  
Every human in the enterprise is responsible for computer security regardless of whether their 
assigned role aligns more closely with IT than OT, or vice versa.  This distinction must be 
recognized by a top-level policy for persistence of a comprehensive computer security culture, 
which in turn contributes to human compliance with computer security policy.    
 
Thus, this research is both novel and timely in its intent to better understand the factors that 
influence human compliance with a comprehensive computer security policy.    
 
This research is novel in that no peer reviewed research was found that explained the direct 
effect of a comprehensive computer security policy on human computer security compliance 
through an understanding of its indirect effects.  To investigate this finding, this study draws on 
the theory of planned behavior (TPB) to understand human intent to comply with a 
comprehensive computer security policy.  TPB is widely used in IS literature to explain human 
behavior through the factors that influence human intent, and is one of the most widely cited 
theoretical frameworks in IS literature on user technology acceptance (Dinev & Hu, 2007).   
Defined by Ajzen (1991), TPB states that human behavior is determined by factors that influence 
the intention to perform a specific behavior.  Rather than model specific human behavior, TPB 
models the behavioral intention of humans. The stronger the intention to perform the behavior, 
the more likely it is that the specific behavior will be performed. The research model for this 
study contributes to novel IS theory in the form of TPB antecedent constructs to explain the 
effects of a comprehensive computer security policy on intention to comply.   
 
This research is timely in that modern computer threats and computer vulnerabilities, sometimes 
referred to as cybersecurity, are evolving rapidly and are capable of introducing significant 
computer risk to an organization (D'Arcy & Hovav, 2007; National Intelligence Council, 2008; 
U.S. Government, 2011; U.S. PPD-41, 2016; UK Government, 2016).   While the extant 
literature includes research on the implications of cybersecurity threat in the IT domain (Acuña, 
2016), the implications of cybersecurity threat in the OT domain have yet to be fully explored 
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and understood (ISACA, 2016; Volz & Finkle, 2016; R. von Solms & van Niekerk, 2013; Zetter, 
2012, 2014, 2015a, 2015b).  In addition to the descriptive or behavioral findings resulting from 
this study, the research model for this study contributes to IS practice in the form of the 
prescriptive power of a comprehensive computer security policy to bind organizational 
constituents to a common cause.   
 
Thus, research that contributes to a better understanding of the theoretical and practical factors 
that influence human intent to comply with a comprehensive computer security policy represents 
research that is important to any organization that relies on humans for computer security.  To 
fill this gap, this study theoretically proposes and empirically tests the effects that a 
comprehensive computer security policy has on human compliance with computer security 
policy.  Specifically, this study focuses on compliance issues associated with NMSVs, and does 
not include issues associated with malicious, criminal intent.    
 
It is the thesis of this study that a comprehensive computer security policy has a direct effect on 
human compliance with computer security policy, which can be further explained through 
indirect effects.  The remainder of this paper includes sections comprising a literature review,  
research model and hypotheses development, research methodology, expected results and 
contribution, limitations, findings and conclusion, and other documentation necessary to support 
this thesis.   
 
Literature Review 
Computer Security Culture & Policy 
It is a premise of this study that human compliance with computer security policy is an element 
of computer security culture that contributes to managing the human aspect of computer security. 
Borrowing from Schein, van Niekerk & von Solms (2010) posit that organizational culture exists 
at three levels (artifacts, espoused values, shared tacit assumptions) and that information security 
knowledge, or lack thereof, represents a fourth level in the scope of an information security 
culture.  von Solms (2000) contends that an information security culture supports the policies, 
procedures, methods and responsibilities of the organization in such a way that information 
security becomes a natural aspect of the day-to-day activities of the workforce and endures long 
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after those who originally created the cultural artifacts are gone.  Straub (1994) posits that it is 
important to learn as much as we can about the effects of culture on information technology 
adoption and use within organizations.   Da Veiga and Eloff (2010) contend that organizational 
approach to computer security should focus on employee behavior, as the success or failure of an 
organization is dependent upon actions that employees do, or fail to do.   As such, organizations 
need to develop a culture of computer security in order to address the threats that humans pose to 
information assets.   
 
Computer security practitioner Bruce Schneier (2004) contends that “security is a process, not a 
product”, and to this end researchers van Niekerk & von Solms (2010) contend that many of the 
processes necessary to protect information assets are largely dependent upon on human behavior. 
van Niekerk & von Solms also contend that computer security culture can be viewed as an 
additional layer of corporate culture, and is critical for managing the human factors associated 
with information security.  von Solms (2000) posits that computer security culture is necessary to 
mitigate the risk that humans present to IS, given that the human dimensions of information 
security cannot be solved by technical and procedural measures alone.  Dhillon, Syed, & Pedron 
(2016) posit that building and sustaining a strong computer security culture is important for the 
protection of information assets, especially during times of change such as the merger of two 
organizations.  The authors contend that a strong culture of computer security forms the basis for 
a common belief system to ensure that all stakeholders remain committed to the protection of 
information assets during a time of change.  The authors also contend that few studies focus on 
security culture. 
 
von Solms (2001) contends that the first artifact that must be created before any implementation 
of information security can begin is a holistic and comprehensive computer security policy. A 
comprehensive computer security policy taking into account all information security dimensions 
serves as the central mandate and framework from which all governing sub-policies, procedures 
and standards emerge.  A top-level comprehensive security policy provides a secure foundation 
for a comprehensive computer security program.  Organizations can spend millions on 
information security technology to no avail if their workforce is not sufficiently aware of  the 
risk associated with information security.  Siponen (2000) contends information security 
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awareness is of critical importance if the objective is to minimize user related faults and increase 
the efficiency of security procedures from a user perspective.   Siponen posits that development 
of such a program requires a systematic approach and that behavioral theories should be 
leveraged to provide answers to end users explaining why they should following security 
guidelines.   
 
Posthumus & von Solms (2004) state that executive management and the board of directors 
should produce a high level organizational policy to visibly show commitment to information 
security and its inclusion within organizational strategy.  Creation of such a policy is typically an 
antecedent activity to establishing the separate components of a  computer security program, and 
serves as a foundation to support separate components such as governance, training & 
awareness, and sanctions.  R. von Solms & von Solms (2004) posit that merely having a policy 
in place does not ensure that the workforce will obey the policy; rather the policy must manifest 
itself through organizational culture which is instantiated through an educational process such as 
a training and awareness program.  Failure to manage computer security from a comprehensive 
enterprise perspective leads to a false sense of security, and little reduction in overall computer 
security risk  (B. von Solms, 2001; Zuccato, 2004, 2007).   
 
Computer Security Policy Compliance 
Spears & Barki (2010) contend that the human presence in computer security can be transformed 
from that of a weak link to an asset that serves to mitigate the vulnerability of human error, 
through increased participation in security policy compliance.  The authors posit that human 
awareness of computer security risk is fundamental to facilitating this transformation. Vroom & 
von Solms  (2004) suggest that alternative techniques beyond the traditional role of auditing need 
to be developed to ensure human compliance with computer security policies, which are needed 
to protect information assets.   
 
Al-Omari, Deokar, El-Gayar, Walters, & Aleassa (2013) investigated the role of ethics to explain 
human behavior with security policy compliance.  The authors contend their findings provide a 
theoretical explanation and empirical support for the impact of an employee’s ethical ideology in 
security policy compliance. Puhakainen & Siponen  (2010) contend that compliance with 
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security policy is a key concern for organizations, as failure to comply with security policy leads 
to loss of security solution efficacy.  Although security training and awareness is commonly 
suggested as a solution for improving security policy compliance, the authors contend that few 
studies rely on theory to explain the factors that influence human behavior in computer security 
compliance.  To validate their hypotheses, the authors leveraged the universal constructive 
instructional theory and the elaboration likelihood model through an action research study.  The 
author’s findings confirm that computer security compliance training is an important factor in 
improving human compliance, and that further research is needed in this domain. 
 
Guo, Yuan, Archer & Connelly (2011) posit that non-malicious security violations (NMSVs) 
share several characteristics; intentionality, self-benefiting without malicious intent, and 
voluntary rule breaking.   Regardless of the characteristic, NMSVs harbor the potential to 
introduce computer risk to an organization.   Intentional NMSVs represent intentional human 
behavior not associated with accidental events. An example of an intentional NMSV is 
intentionally clicking on an embedded link in a phishing email, when the email is known to be a 
deliberate phishing attempt.  Self-benefiting without malicious intent NMSVs represent human 
behavior that results from humans trying to help themselves.  An example of a self-benefiting 
NMSV is when humans purposefully skip steps in a process or procedure to save time and effort.  
Voluntary rule breaking NMSVs occur when humans consciously violate organizational policies 
which define actions that they may or may not be allowed to do.  Non-compliance with a 
computer security policy is an example of a voluntary rule breaking NMSV.   The authors 
contend that NMSV behavior differs from malicious behavior in that NMSV behavior is not 
characterized as illegal, criminal activity.   
 
Theory of Planned Behavior 
The theory of planned behavior (TPB) is an extension of the theory of reasoned action (TRA) 
(Madden, Ellen, & Ajzen, 1992). TPB seeks to predict and understand motivational influences 
on human behavior.  TPB differs from TRA in the addition of a perceived behavioral control 
construct which has direct and indirect effects on behavior.  Defined by Ajzen (1991), TPB  
(Figure 1) states that human behavior is determined by factors that influence the intention to 
perform a specific behavior.  Rather than model specific human behavior, TPB models human  
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behavioral intention. The stronger the intention to perform the behavior, the more likely it is that 
the specific behavior will be performed.  TPB  was deemed a necessary extension to TRA due to 
limitations in dealing with behavioral issues over which humans have incomplete volitional 
control. For example, a person may believe their outcomes are determined by their behavior, but 
they may also believe that their chances of achieving a desired outcome are not likely.   As a 
result, perceived behavioral control varies across situations and actions, and in some cases can be 
used directly to predict a successful behavioral attempt.   
 
 
Figure 1.  Theory of Planned Behavior 
 
Ajzen’s TPB model consists of five constructs; attitude toward the behavior, subjective norm, 
perceived behavior control, intention, and behavior (Table 1).   Attitude toward the behavior is 
defined as the degree to which a person has a favorable or unfavorable evaluation or appraisal of 
the behavior in question.  Behavioral beliefs influence attitudes toward the behavior.  Subjective 
norm is defined as a social factor that refers to the perceived social pressure to  perform or not 
perform the behavior.  Normative beliefs are the underlying determinants of subjective norms.  
Perceived behavior control is defined as the perceived ease or difficulty of performing the 
behavior, which also reflects past experience as well as anticipated impediments and obstacles.  
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Control beliefs provide the basis for perceptions of behavioral control, which are strongly 
influenced by the amount of control a person actually has over the resources required to perform 
the behavior.  As previously mentioned, a person may believe their outcomes are determined by 
their behavior, but they may also believe that their chances of achieving a desired outcome are 
not likely. Perceived behavioral control can be used to predict behavior, to the extent that 
perceived control is realistic.  Lastly, intention is defined as the dependent variable that captures 
the aggregated motivational factors that influence behavior; the stronger the intention to perform 
a behavior, the more likely it is for that behavior to be performed.   Thus, behavior has an 
implied dependency on intent, given that behavior is directly proportional to intent (Song & 
Zahedi, 2005). 
 
Table 1.  Conceptual Definition of TPB Constructs  
Construct Determinant Definition 
Attitude toward the 
behavior 
Independent 
The degree to which a person has a favorable or 
unfavorable evaluation or appraisal of the behavior 
in question.  Behavioral beliefs influence attitudes 
toward the behavior. 
Subjective norm Independent 
A social factor that refers to the perceived social 
pressure to  perform or not perform the behavior.  
Normative beliefs are the underlying determinants 
of subjective norms. 
Perceived behavioral 
control 
Independent 
The perceived ease or difficulty of performing the 
behavior, which also reflects past experience as 
well as anticipated impediments and obstacles.  
Control beliefs provide the basis for perceptions of 
behavioral control. 
Intention Dependent 
Intention captures the motivational factors that 
influence behavior; the stronger the intention to 
engage in a behavior, the more likely it is to be 
performed. 
Behavior Implied Dependency 
The actual behavior to be performed.  Dependency 
is implied given that behavior is directly 
proportional to intent (Song & Zahedi, 2005). 
 
Tsohou, Karyda, & Kokolakis (2015) contend that compliance with security policies needs to be 
aligned with the factors affecting the internalization of the security objectives.  The authors posit 
that studies on computer security compliance draw on theoretical backgrounds such as TPB, 
TRA, protection motivation theory, and neutralization theory to understand human intention to 
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comply with computer security policy.  Dinev & Hu (2007) contend that TPB is one of the most 
widely cited theoretical frameworks in IS literature on user technology acceptance.    Most IS 
studies that reference TPB model four of the five TPB constructs, specifically attitude toward the 
behavior, subjective norm, perceived behavior control, and intention.  Given that that behavior is 
directly proportional to intent, the behavior construct is not displayed in most IS studies. 
 
Recent IS studies have used Ajzen’s TPB, modified with antecedent constructs (Appendix C),  to 
better understand the factors that influence human intention to perform a specific human 
behavior.  Human intention modeled in these studies includes the factors that influence human 
intention to comply with computer security policy (Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Guo et al., 2011), the 
factors that influence human intention to accept change in protective computer technologies  
(Dinev & Hu, 2007), the factors that influence human intention to resist social engineering 
(Flores & Ekstedt, 2016), and the factors that facilitate human intention to understand and adopt 
e-commerce technology (Pavlou & Fygenson, 2006; Song & Zahedi, 2005).   In each of these 
studies, researchers leveraged TPB to understand the factors that influence human intention to 
perform some aspect of human behavior within information systems.  While each of these 
studies incorporates additional, antecedent constructs to further understand the core TPB 
constructs,  the core TPB model remains the same;  constructs of attitude toward the behavior, 
subjective norm, and perceived behavioral control are modeled as independent variables to 
predict the construct of intention, which is modeled as the dependent variable. 
 
Social Identity Theory 
Hogg, Terry, & White (1995) contend that social identity theory (SIT) is an accepted perspective 
on the social constructs of self-concept and normative behavior.  The authors also contend that 
SIT shares the same perspective as identity theory, with the primary distinction being that SIT is 
a proven psychology theory used to explain group processes and intergroup relations.  SIT is 
used to explain behavioral tendencies that cause people to classify themselves and others into 
various social categories such as religious affiliation, organizational recognition, gender, and 
age.  Ashforth & Mael (1989) posit that this classification gives a person the ability to segment 
and order the social environment into a meaningful structure, and then to locate and define 
themselves in that social environment.  By socially identifying with a group, the individual is 
doctoral dissertation final defense ACUNA v5.3 Page 17 of 97 
 
viewed as sharing in the group’s success and status.  SIT was developed by Tajfel (Billig & 
Tajfel, 1973), based on studies that explored the role of intergroup behavior.  Cheung & Lee 
(2010) contend that social identity helps to determine collective intention to perform a behavior.  
The authors define three major components of social identity as cognitive social identity, 
evaluative social identity, and affective social identity.  The authors contend that if an end user 
exhibits strong social identity toward a group behavior, then intention will increase.   
 
Song & Kim (2006) synthesized TPB and social identity theory (SIT) to predict behavioral 
intention to use a service.  Specifically, Song & Kim leveraged the link between SIT  and the 
TPB construct of subjective norm.  The authors contend that subjective norm is an important 
determinant of behavioral intention to use a specific technology. 
 
Interaction Theory 
Change is typically met with resistance, and the introduction of change will encounter resistance 
from those who are held accountable to the change.  Markus (1983) contends that interaction 
theory (INT) provides a framework against which the introduction of change can be better 
managed.  INT is posited to be useful with decentralized systems when a centralized system is 
desired, and with systems that alter the balance of power in regard to those who lose power and 
those who gain power. 
 
Kling (1980) provides a starting point for explaining interaction theory (INT) by positing that 
people and groups resist change introduced by system implementation due to the interaction 
between characteristics in people and characteristics related to the system.  The operative word 
in interaction theory is interaction, as INT is based on the interactions between characteristics 
related to people and characteristics related to systems, as opposed to individual, internal beliefs.  
As an example, the interaction between people and information systems that often accompanies 
organizational change might be perceived at odds with existing organizational culture.  From this 
perspective the greater the implied change, the more likely the resistance to the change.  It is 
from this perspective that Markus  (1983) posits that INT represents a superior method for 
developing information system implementation strategies for managing beliefs about resistance 
during information system implementation.  Markus extends Kling’s work by exploring variants 
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in resistance to change during the implementation of computer based information systems.  
Markus notes that similar variants on INT are made by Ginzberg (1975) and Keen (1981).  
Markus posits that INT offers a superior theory for managing beliefs about resistance to change 
that are encountered during information system implementation.  Some of the practical 
recommendations for implementation posited by INT are; repair organizational problems before 
introducing new systems, restructure incentives for system users and system designers, 
restructure relationships between system users and system designers, and carefully determine the 
initial users of the new system. 
 
Deterrence Theory 
IS studies have used deterrence theory (DET) to explain unethical human behavior involving the 
use of technology in organizations.  Deterrence theory suggests that the perceived certainty and 
severity of formal sanctions serves as a deterrent to committing an illicit act (D'Arcy & Devaraj, 
2012).  D’Arcy & Devaraj contend that the threat of formal sanctions has both direct and indirect 
influences on the intentional misuse of technology.  Hu, Xu, Dinev, & Ling (2011) report 
findings that partially contradict the accepted view of deterrent theory and information security, 
by stating that behavior is influenced more by an individual’s personal ethics, or moral compass, 
than the ramifications of a deterrent alone.  This aligns with findings by Siponen & Vance (2010) 
in which deterrence mechanisms are less effective when neutralization techniques are present. 
 
Johnston, Warkentin, & Siponen (2015) posit that studies of sanction rhetoric have yielded 
mixed results leading researches to question the effectiveness of fear appeals.  The authors 
contend that this is due to sanction rhetoric failing to focus on the impact of personal relevance, 
while over emphasizing the impact to IS assets.  The authors posit that sanction rhetoric that 
emphasizes the impact of both personal relevance and IS relevance provides a positive influence 
on intention to comply with information security policy, thus confirming that sanction rhetoric  
influences human intention.  D’Arcy & Greene (2014) contend that enforcement activities are a 
key facet of any information security culture. D’Arcy & Devaraj (2012) contend organizations 
face increased computer security risk due to organizations increasing reliance on IS to achieve 
organizational objectives, with one risk being individual misuse of information assets. The 
authors state that the threat of formal sanctions has direct and indirect influences on an 
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individual’s intention to misuse information assets.  Herath & Rao (2009) posit that sanctions are 
effective in reducing negative behavior, and exhibit a positive influence on social behavior.    
 
Literature Review Summary 
The results of this literature review confirm that it is not well known how a comprehensive 
computer security policy effects human compliance with computer security policy, as no studies 
were found on this topic.  The results also confirm that while the literature supports a holistic 
enterprise computer security policy, the description of a comprehensive computer security policy 
is not well defined. The notion of a comprehensive computer security policy encompassing both 
IT computer security and OT computer security was not apparent.  These findings represent gaps 
in IS literature, and provide the motivation for this study.   
 
Although terms such as information security and cybersecurity share similar meanings and tend 
to be used interchangeably in the literature, R. von Solms & van Niekerk (2013) contend that the 
terms are not fully analogous.  The authors posit that while information security and 
cybersecurity reference similar language to define the processes and procedures used to protect 
information assets, each term defines the impact of the human factor in a different way.  
Information security typically refers to the human factor in regard to the role of the human in the 
security process, while cybersecurity refers to the human factor as a potential target, or 
vulnerability, of a cyberattack.  For purpose of this study the term computer security adopts the 
same meaning as information security, the impact of the human factor in a security process. 
 
Research Model and Hypotheses Development 
Theoretical Foundation 
It is the thesis of this study that a comprehensive computer security policy has a direct effect on 
human compliance with computer security policy, which can be further explained through 
indirect effects.  It is a premise of this study that human compliance with computer security 
policy is an element of computer security culture that contributes to managing the human aspect 
of computer security.  Based on these beliefs, and the acceptance within the IS research 
community to leverage TPB to model intention to perform an IS behavior, TPB was selected as 
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the theoretical foundation for measuring human intention to comply with a comprehensive 
computer security policy.   
 
TPB states that human behavior is determined by factors that influence human intention to 
perform a specific behavior.  Rather than model specific human behavior, TPB models human 
behavioral intention. The stronger the intention to perform the behavior the more likely it is that 
the specific behavior will be performed, given that behavior is directly proportional to intent. The 
implication for this study is that the stronger the intention to comply with a comprehensive 
computer security policy, the more likely it is that an end user will actually exhibit the behavior 
to comply with the policy.    
 
 Figure 2.  Theoretical Foundation  
 
Given that perceived behavioral control varies across situations and actions, TPB provides a 
framework to measure both the direct and indirect effects of human intention to comply with a 
comprehensive computer security policy.   Based on end user volitional control,  the construct of 
perceived behavior control provides the means to measure the direct effect of human intention to 
comply with a comprehensive computer security policy.   
 
To measure the indirect effects that impact intention to comply with a comprehensive computer 
security policy, the TPB base model was extended by incorporating antecedent constructs 
borrowed from social identity theory, interaction theory, and deterrence theory (Figure 2).  SIT 
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was chosen to further define the normative beliefs underlying the intention to comply.  SIT helps 
to explain group processes and intergroup relations, as well as behavioral tendencies that cause 
people to classify themselves and others into various social categories such as religious 
affiliation, organizational recognition, gender, and age.  Understanding why an end user 
identifies positively or negatively with a group associated with the implementation of a 
comprehensive computer security policy will provide meaningful insight into the normative 
beliefs underlying the subjective norms that effect intention to comply. 
 
INT was chosen to further define the interaction that occurs between an end user and their 
significant referents to overcome resistance to change, in relation to shaping end user attitude 
toward a comprehensive computer security policy.  Given that a comprehensive computer 
security policy establishes the foundation for clear ownership of enterprise computer security by 
merging the IT computer security domain with the OT computer security domain, it is practical 
to expect that the introduction of a comprehensive computer security policy will encounter 
resistance from those who are held accountable to the new policy.  Introduction of a 
comprehensive computer security policy will inevitably cause a perceived shift in organizational 
power between members of the IT domain and members of the OT domain, and this resistance 
will need to be managed and mitigated if acceptance of the new policy is to be successful.     
 
DET was chosen to further define the development of self-efficacy in regard to being confident 
in one’s ability to comply with a comprehensive computer security policy.  Although results are 
mixed on whether or not deterrence positively impacts intention to comply with policy, sanction 
rhetoric that emphasizes the impact of both personal relevance and IS relevance is believed to 
provide a positive influence on intention to comply with policy.  Personal relevance is impacted 
by reinforcing the need for an end user to sharpen the skills necessary to perform a behavior, 
which in turn reinforces end user confidence in performing the behavior in order to avoid the 
enforcement of sanctions.  Sanction enforcements are believed to be key to information security 
culture, by reducing negative behavior and exerting a positive influence on social behavior.    
 
Therefore, given the perceived influence of social identity, interaction with others, and the effect 
of sanction rhetoric in positively effecting intention to comply with a comprehensive computer 
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security policy, the theoretical concepts of SIT, INT, and DET are incorporated into the 
theoretical foundation as antecedent theories to TPB (Figure 2).  This theoretical foundation 
contributes to a better understanding of human behavior and NMSVs.  This theoretical 
foundation also aligns with Schein’s formal definition of organizational culture; “a pattern of 
shared basic assumptions that was learned by a group as it solved its problems of external 
adaptation and internal integration, that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, 
therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation 
to those problems.”    
 
Hypotheses Development 
This study draws on TPB to predict human intent to comply with a comprehensive computer 
security policy. The use of TPB in recent IS literature to predict human intent is well 
documented.  Bulgurcu et al. (2010) leveraged a modified version of TPB to investigate the 
factors that influence employees to comply with information security policy compliance for 
purpose of protecting organizational information and technology assets  (Table C1).  Dinev & 
Hu (2007) leveraged a modified version of TPB to understand user intention to accept the 
introduction of new, protective technologies (Table C2).  Flores & Ekstedt (2016)  leveraged a 
modified version of TPB to understand how organizational and individual factors complement 
each other in shaping employee intention to resist social engineering (Table C3).  Guo et al. 
(2011) leveraged a modified version of TPB to understand  user intentions to engage in NMSV 
behavior (Table C4).  Pavlou & Fygenson (2006) leveraged a modified version of TPB to 
evaluate human beliefs for predicting e-commerce adoption  (Table C5), while Song & Zahedi 
(2005) leveraged TPB to develop a new conceptual framework for explaining website influence 
on the behavior of online customers (Table C6).  Therefore, based on the documented use of TPB 
in recent IS research, hypotheses drawn against the TPB constructs of subjective norms, attitude, 
and perceived behavioral control are included in the research model, but have been modified to 
support this study.  These hypotheses are included for completeness, as the research model 
cannot be tested without these paths. 
 
This study also incorporates constructs drawn from SIT, INT, and DET as antecedent constructs 
to TPB constructs to better understand the indirect factors that predict human intent to comply 
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with a comprehensive computer security policy.  In doing so, this study makes a unique 
contribution to IS literature by incorporating TPB with other behavioral theories through the use 
of antecedent constructs.  Drawing from the use of SIT in recent IS studies, Cheung & Lee 
(2010) leveraged SIT to measure group intention to use a social networking site by measuring 
subjective norm and social identity.  The authors contend that subjective norms reflect social 
pressure from significant others to perform a behavior, as a user tends to rely on subjective 
norms to decide whether or not to use a new technology.  The authors posit that if an end user 
exhibits strong social identity toward a group behavior, then intention will increase.  Song & 
Kim  (2006) synthesized TRA, the progenitor of TPB, and SIT to predict behavioral intention to 
use a service.  Specifically, the authors leveraged SIT, TRA, and relationships between the 
constructs of social identity and subjective norm to predict user intention.  The authors contend 
that subjective norms are an important determinant of behavioral intention to use a specific 
technology. 
 
Drawing from the use of INT in recent IS studies, Markus (1983) posits that INT represents a 
superior method for managing beliefs about resistance to change, and that INT offers a superior 
theory for managing the resistance encountered during information system implementation.  INT 
is posited to be useful with decentralized systems when a centralized system is desired, and with 
systems that alter the balance of power in regard to those who lose power and those who gain 
power.   
  
Drawing from the use of DET in recent IS studies yields mixed results.  While several studies 
contend that enforcement activities are an important part of any information security culture, IS 
studies incorporating DET have revealed positive and negative influences on intention.     
D’Arcy & Devaraj (2012) contend that the threat of formal sanctions has direct and indirect 
influences on an individual’s intention to misuse information assets.  Herath & Rao (2009) posit 
that sanctions are an effective mechanism in reducing negative behavior and exhibit a positive 
influence on social behavior.  Johnston, Warkentin, & Siponen (2015) contend sanction rhetoric 
that emphasizes the impact of both personal relevance and IS relevance provides a positive 
influence on intention to comply with information security policy, confirming that sanction 
rhetoric influences human intention.   
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Therefore, based on the usage pattern of the theory of planned behavior, social identity theory, 
interaction theory,  and deterrence theory in recent IS research, this study uses a modified 
version of TPB to measure the factors that influence human intention to comply with a 
comprehensive computer security policy.  The traditional TPB constructs of subjective norms, 
attitude, and perceived behavioral control (Table 1) are modeled in expected form as 
independent variables against a construct of intention as the dependent variable. New constructs 
of comprehensive computer security policy understanding, social identity with organizational 
others, resistance to policy compliance, and perceived effect of sanctions for non-compliance 
(Table 2) are incorporated as antecedent constructs to TPB (Figure 3) to further measure the 
predictability of human intent to comply with a comprehensive computer security policy.  In 
regard to structural equation modeling (SEM) notation, the representation of each of these 
constructs as exogenous or endogenous is indicated in Table 2. 
 
Table 2.  Research Model Constructs 
Construct Label Determinant Definition Source 
Comprehensive 
Computer 
Security Policy 
Understanding 
CS 
Antecedent to 
TPB 
Exogenous to this 
study 
End user understanding of a 
top-level enterprise policy 
incorporating all aspects of 
enterprise computer security.  
(CIM Reference Model 
Committee International 
Purdue Workshop on 
Industrial Computer 
Systems, 1989; ISACA, 
2016) 
Social Identity 
with 
Organizational 
Others 
SI 
Antecedent to 
TPB 
Endogenous to 
this study 
Identity with one or more  
groups that approve of 
compliance with a 
comprehensive computer 
security policy. 
(Cheung & Lee, 2010; 
Song & Kim, 2006) 
Resistance to 
Policy 
Compliance 
RE 
Antecedent to 
TPB 
Endogenous to 
this study 
Introduction of a new policy 
will encounter resistance 
from those who are held 
accountable to the new 
policy. 
(Markus, 1983) 
 
Perceived 
Effect of 
Sanctions for 
Non-
Compliance 
PS 
Antecedent to 
TPB 
Endogenous to 
this study 
Sanction rhetoric that 
emphasizes the impact of 
both personal relevance and 
IS relevance provides a 
positive influence on 
intention to comply with the 
new policy 
(D'Arcy & Devaraj, 2012; 
Hu et al., 2011; Johnston 
et al., 2015; M. Siponen 
& Vance, 2010) 
Normative 
Belief to 
NB Independent 
The approval or disapproval 
that end user peers are 
(Ajzen, 1991), (Bulgurcu 
et al., 2010), (Guo et al., 
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Comply with 
Policy 
within TPB 
Endogenous to 
this study 
expected to express in 
relation to complying with a 
comprehensive computer 
security policy.  
2011), (Dinev & Hu, 
2007), (Flores & Ekstedt, 
2016; Pavlou & 
Fygenson, 2006; Song & 
Zahedi, 2005) 
Attitude 
Toward 
Comprehensive 
Computer 
Security 
AT 
Independent 
within TPB 
Endogenous to 
this study 
End user attitude toward 
complying with a 
comprehensive computer 
security policy. 
(Ajzen, 1991), (Bulgurcu 
et al., 2010), (Guo et al., 
2011), (Dinev & Hu, 
2007), (Flores & Ekstedt, 
2016; Pavlou & 
Fygenson, 2006; Song & 
Zahedi, 2005) 
Self-Efficacy to 
Comply with 
Policy 
SE 
Independent 
within TPB 
Endogenous to 
this study 
End user perception of 
personal skills, knowledge, or 
competency regarding ability 
to comply with a 
comprehensive computer 
security policy. 
(Ajzen, 1991), (Bulgurcu 
et al., 2010), (Guo et al., 
2011), (Dinev & Hu, 
2007), (Flores & Ekstedt, 
2016; Pavlou & 
Fygenson, 2006; Song & 
Zahedi, 2005) 
Intention to 
Comply With 
Comprehensive 
Computer 
Security Policy 
IN 
Dependent within 
TPB 
Endogenous to 
this study 
End user intention to comply 
with a computer security 
policy. 
(Ajzen, 1991), (Bulgurcu 
et al., 2010), (Guo et al., 
2011), (Dinev & Hu, 
2007), (Flores & Ekstedt, 
2016; Pavlou & 
Fygenson, 2006; Song & 
Zahedi, 2005) 
 
The hypotheses developed for this study were constructed as follows.  It is postulated that 
organizations create a comprehensive computer security policy incorporating enterprise scope 
and ownership of IT computer security and OT computer security into a single, high level policy 
that binds all humans in the enterprise to a common cause.   Once created, the enterprise must 
educate the workforce to make each individual aware of the new policy, and help each individual 
understand the purpose of the new policy and the benefits that will follow.  The benefits will be 
explained in terms of how they impact the enterprise and each individual;  positive explanations 
in the sense of the good things that will follow if individuals comply with the policy (reduced 
human error and fewer NMSVs), and negative explanations in the sense of the bad things that 
will follow if individuals do not comply with the policy (ongoing human error and more 
NMSVs).    
 
Drawing from the premise that SIT is used to explain behavioral tendencies that cause people to 
classify themselves and others into various social categories, and that individuals with awareness 
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and understanding of the personal and IS benefits of a comprehensive computer security policy 
will identify with each other to avoid NMSV behavior by complying with a comprehensive 
computer security policy under personal volitional control, it is hypothesized that:   
 
Hypotheses 1 (H1) - An end user’s relationship beliefs about others in regard to avoiding NMSV 
behavior is positively associated with the intention to comply with a comprehensive computer 
security policy. 
 
Once implemented, the existence of a comprehensive computer security policy may cause a 
perceived shift in organizational power between members of the IT domain and members of the 
OT domain.  Changes to the status quo are typically met with resistance from the affected 
individuals, and this resistance will need to be managed and mitigated if acceptance of the new 
policy is to be successful.  Drawing from the premise that INT in the form of constructive 
conversation can be used to rationalize and overcome resistance toward complying with a 
comprehensive computer security policy, it is hypothesized that: 
 
Hypotheses 2 (H2) – An end user’s conversations with others in regard to complying with a 
comprehensive computer security policy are positively associated with the intention to comply 
with a comprehensive computer security policy. 
 
Enforcement activities in the form of sanctions are an important part of persisting IS culture. IS 
studies have shown that sanctions influence human intention. Sanction rhetoric that emphasizes 
the impact of both personal relevance and IS relevance has been shown to have a positive 
influence on intention to comply with IS policy.  Drawing from the premise that DET in the form 
of positive sanction rhetoric can be used to reinforce intention to comply with a comprehensive 
computer security policy, it is hypothesized that: 
 
Hypotheses 3 (H3) – Penalties that emphasize the enterprise benefit and end user benefit of 
avoiding NMSV behavior are positively associated with the intention to comply with a 
comprehensive computer security policy.  
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Based on the premise that social identity with similar minded individuals serves as affirmation of 
the normative beliefs associated with intention to comply; that conversation intended to 
overcome resistance to change is an effective means of influencing the attitude of others thereby 
influencing intention to comply; and that sanction rhetoric will influence self-efficacy and 
personal intent to comply, it is hypothesized that these beliefs serve to bridge antecedent 
constructs drawn from SIT, INT, and DET to their corresponding TPB constructs.   Drawing 
from recent IS studies that have modified Ajzen’s TPB with antecedent constructs to better 
understand the indirect factors that influence human intention to perform a specific human 
behavior, it is hypothesized that: 
 
Hypotheses 4 (H4) – An end user’s relationship beliefs about others in regard to avoiding NMSV 
behavior enhances the normative belief to avoid NMSV behavior and is positively associated 
with the intention to comply with a comprehensive computer security policy. 
 
Hypotheses 5 (H5) – An end user’s conversations with others in regard to complying with a 
comprehensive computer security policy enhances end user attitude toward complying with a 
comprehensive computer security policy and are positively associated with the intention to 
comply with a comprehensive computer security policy. 
 
Hypotheses 6 (H6) – Penalties that emphasize the enterprise benefit and end user benefit of 
avoiding NMSV behavior enhance end user self-efficacy toward complying with a comprehensive 
computer security policy and are positively associated with the intention to comply with a 
comprehensive computer security policy. 
 
For this study, normative beliefs represent the underlying determinants of subjective norms.  As 
such, they represent the approval or disapproval that end user peers are expected to express in 
relation to complying with a comprehensive computer security policy.  Borrowing from the 
literature, this study posits that an end user’s intention to comply with a comprehensive computer 
security policy is positively associated with their personal belief and interactive group belief that 
a comprehensive computer security policy will be positively received by their peers and 
referents.  Therefore, it is hypothesized that: 
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Hypothesis7 (H7) – An end user’s normative beliefs toward a comprehensive computer security 
policy are positively associated with their intention to comply with a comprehensive computer 
security policy. 
 
Table 3.  Research Model Hypotheses 
Hypothesis Label Description 
1 H1 
An end user’s relationship beliefs about others in regard to avoiding NMSV 
behavior is positively associated with the intention to comply with a 
comprehensive computer security policy. 
2 H2 
An end user’s conversations with others in regard to complying with a 
comprehensive computer security policy are positively associated with the 
intention to comply with a comprehensive computer security policy. 
3 H3 
Penalties that emphasize the enterprise benefit and end user benefit of 
avoiding NMSV behavior are positively associated with the intention to 
comply with a comprehensive computer security policy. 
4 H4 
An end user’s relationship beliefs about others in regard to avoiding NMSV 
behavior enhances the normative belief to avoid NMSV behavior and is 
positively associated with the intention to comply with a comprehensive 
computer security policy.  
5 H5 
An end user’s conversations with others in regard to complying with a 
comprehensive computer security policy enhances end user attitude 
toward complying with a comprehensive computer security policy and are 
positively associated with the intention to comply with a comprehensive 
computer security policy. 
6 H6 
Penalties that emphasize the enterprise benefit and end user benefit of 
avoiding NMSV behavior enhance end user self-efficacy toward complying 
with a comprehensive computer security policy and are positively 
associated with the intention to comply with a comprehensive computer 
security policy. 
7 H7 
An end user’s normative beliefs toward a comprehensive computer 
security policy are positively associated with their intention to comply with 
a comprehensive computer security policy. 
8 H8 
An end user’s attitude toward a comprehensive computer security policy is 
positively associated with their intention to comply with a comprehensive 
computer security policy. 
9 H9 
An end user’s self-efficacy beliefs toward a comprehensive computer 
security policy are positively associated with their intention to comply with 
a comprehensive computer security policy. 
10 H10 
An end user’s understanding of the enterprise benefits and personal 
benefits associated with a comprehensive computer security policy 
positively affects their volitional control and intention to comply with a 
comprehensive computer security policy. 
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For this study, attitude refers to end user attitude toward a comprehensive computer security 
policy.  Borrowing from the literature, this study posits that an end user’s intention to comply 
with a comprehensive computer security policy is positively associated with their attitude toward 
a comprehensive computer security policy.  This study also posits that normative belief in the 
outcome of complying with a comprehensive computer security policy is positively associated 
with their attitude toward a comprehensive computer security policy, and that their perception of 
self-efficacy is positively associated with their attitude toward a comprehensive security policy.  
Therefore, it is hypothesized that: 
 
Hypothesis 8 (H8) – An end user’s attitude toward a comprehensive computer security policy is 
positively associated with their intention to comply with a comprehensive computer security 
policy. 
 
For this study, self-efficacy represents the control beliefs that provide the basis for perceptions of 
behavioral control, and is used interchangeably with perceived behavioral control.  As such, self-
efficacy represents end user judgment of personal skills, knowledge, or competency regarding 
ability to comply with a comprehensive computer security policy. Borrowing from the literature, 
this study posits that an end user’s intention to comply with a comprehensive computer security 
policy is positively associated with their belief that they will be able to comply with a 
comprehensive computer security policy.  Therefore, it is hypothesized that: 
 
Hypothesis 9 (H9) - An end user’s self-efficacy beliefs toward a comprehensive computer 
security policy are positively associated with their intention to comply with a comprehensive 
computer security policy. 
 
Drawing from the premise that individuals with a positive awareness and understanding of a 
comprehensive computer security policy will avoid NMSV behavior by complying with a 
comprehensive computer security policy, and  that self-efficacy in the form of volitional control 
can be used directly to predict a successful behavioral attempt, it is hypothesized that: 
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Hypothesis 10 (H10) – An end user’s understanding of the enterprise benefits and personal 
benefits associated with a comprehensive computer security policy positively affects their 
volitional control and intention to comply with a comprehensive computer security policy. 
 
Control Variables   
Control variables are variables that are not directly linked to hypotheses in a research model, but 
are considered directly linked to the dependent variable (Flores & Ekstedt, 2016; Spector & 
Branick, 2010).  The dependent variable in this study is the construct labeled intention to comply 
with comprehensive computer security policy (Table 2, IN).  This study makes use of six control 
variables (Appendix B, Table B2) to control for variance in the dependent variable.  The control 
variables for this study are age, gender, level of education, IT/OT identity, years of professional 
computer experience working in an industry sector, and industry sector. The inclusion of 
industry sector as a control variable aligns with the contention by Bulgurcu et al. (2010) that 
some industries are more vulnerable to computer security issues than other industries.   For 
purpose of this study, a modified three-sector theory construct (primary, secondary, tertiary, 
quaternary) served as the basis for the industry sector model (Fisher, 1939).   
 
Research Model 
Following development of the theoretical foundation (Figure 2), the constructs listed in Table 2, 
the hypotheses listed in Table 3, and the control variables listed in Appendix B (Table B2), each 
variable was operationalized  into  the research model, or path diagram, shown in Figure 3.  
Labeled the TPB Base Research Model with Antecedent Constructs, the research model depicted 
in Figure 3 is a form of path diagram which describes the relationships between the various 
model constructs.  The model incorporates new antecedent constructs (dashed lines) from social 
identity theory, interaction theory, and deterrence theory with traditional TPB constructs (solid 
lines) to better understand the factors that influence intention to comply with a comprehensive 
computer security policy. 
 
Direct and Indirect Effects 
A SEM model consists of two components; a structural model and a measurement model.  The 
structural model, often referred to as a path diagram, depicts the latent variables of a SEM 
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model.  The measurement model depicts the manifest, or observed, variables of a SEM model as 
they relate to the structural model.  Together, the structural model combined with the 
measurement model produce a complete SEM model (Byrne, 1998; Malhotra, Lopes, & Veiga, 
2014).  
 
The path diagram depicted in Figure 3 was drawn using a simplified form of SEM notation to 
describe dependence relationships between independent and dependent variables.  Relationships, 
or paths, represent hypotheses and are indicated by the straight, single-headed arrows linking 
independent variables with dependent variables.  Independent variables, also known as 
exogenous variables, do not have any straight, single-headed arrows pointing at them.  
Dependent variables, also known as endogenous variables, have one or more straight, single-
headed arrows pointing at them.    Thus indirect effects, or indirect paths, are represented by a 
path linking three or more variables; one exogenous variable and two or more endogenous 
variables.  Direct effects, or direct paths,  are represented by a path linking no more than two 
variables; one exogenous variable and one endogenous variable.  For purpose of this study, 
Figure 3 contains three indirect effects; indirect path CS-SI-NB-IN, indirect path CS-RE-AT-IN, 
and indirect path CS-PS-SE-IN.  In contrast, Figure 3 contains only one direct effect; direct path 
CS-IN.  It is from this perspective that the research model depicted in Figure 3 will be used to 
evaluate the thesis of this study that a comprehensive computer security policy has a direct effect 
on human compliance with computer security policy, which can be further explained through 
indirect effects. 
 
The path diagram shown in Figure 3 models the inclusion of TPB constructs, new SIT, INT, and 
DET antecedent constructs, 3 indirect (mediating) paths, 1 direct path, 6 control (moderating) 
variables, 10 research hypotheses, 1 dependent variable (intention to comply), several 
independent variables, 1 exogenous construct (comprehensive computer security policy), and 
several endogenous constructs. 
 
The final research model will include a measurement model in addition to the structural model, 
or path diagram, shown in Figure 3.  The structural model will consist of 8 latent variables, and 
the measurement model will consist of 30 manifest variables. 
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Figure 3.  TPB Base Research Model with Antecedent Constructs (Path Diagram) 
 
Using SEM, a type of statistical analysis that explains the strength of relationship between the 
multiple variables that are linked together in a path diagram, the operationalized research model 
will be used to determine whether or not the theoretical model (Figure 2) for this study fits the 
actual relationships observed in the research model (Figure 3) for this study.  Each of the 
variables shown in Figure 3 is measurable using the survey instrument and indicators described 
in Appendix B (Table B3).   
 
Research Methodology  
Protection of Human Subjects 
In keeping with the policy for the protection of human subjects in research as described in 45 
CFR 46.101 (b) (HHS, 2017), it is the intent of this study to minimize risk and optimize benefits 
for each human participant, while completing the stated research objectives.   
 
Survey Instrument and Data Collection 
The research methodology for this study includes the collection of data using a survey 
instrument, and analysis of the collected data using generally accepted multivariate data analysis 
techniques (Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2010a; Kumar, 2005; Trochim & Donnelly, 2008).  
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The survey instrument (Appendix B) utilized a 7-point Likert scale for measurement.   TPB 
recommends use of a 7-point Likert scale for measurement of belief strength and for evaluation 
measurement (Ajzen, 1991).  Measurement of TPB indicators in IS research is mixed, with 
evidence of unipolar and bipolar, 7-point and 5-point Likert scales.  This study adopts the 
unipolar 7-point Likert scale recommended by Ajzen for measurement (Figure B1).   Use case 
scenarios (Table B1) and questions (Table B3) for the survey instrument will be drawn, where 
possible, from previous studies conducted in this research domain (Flores & Ekstedt, 2016; Guo 
et al., 2011; Pavlou & Fygenson, 2006).   Six control variables are utilized in this study (Table 
B2);  age, gender, level of education, IT/OT identity, years of professional computer experience 
working in an industry sector, and industry sector. 
 
Questionnaire distribution and subsequent data collection was contracted to Qualtrics (2016), a 
commercial Internet service that specializes in survey based research.  Costs associated with the 
use of a commercial service were paid by the principal investigator at personal expense. 
Although the survey instrument was modeled after recent IS studies that leveraged TPB survey 
research, a small pilot survey (n=10) was conducted prior to the primary data survey to ensure 
robustness.  The target population for this study was experienced, industry based, authorized 
users located in the United States, randomly selected from various industry sectors.   Qualtrics 
provides participants with an incentive to participate  based on the length of the survey, specific 
participant profile, and participant acquisition difficulty. The specific type of reward varies and 
may include cash, airline miles, gift cards, redeemable points, sweepstakes entry, and vouchers. 
The incentive provided to participants was determined by Qualtrics and not the principal 
investigator.  The estimated cost per participant representing the cost of labor, services provided, 
and incentive, was estimated at $12 to $15 per participant.   Identifiers capable of linking a 
response to a participant, including Internet Protocol (IP) address, are managed by Qualtrics and 
thus remain hidden and unknown to the principal investigator.   
 
Sample Size 
Hair et al. (2010a) recommend a sample size of 100 to 400 for SEM studies.  The most common 
SEM estimation procedure is maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) which supports a minimum 
sample size of 50, but recommends a sample size of 200 to provide a sound basis for estimation.  
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Under MLE, SEM sample sizes range between 100 – 400, as sample sizes greater than 400 
become sensitive to meaningless differences resulting in goodness-of-fit (GOF) measures that 
suggest a poor fit.  Therefore, based on MLE recommendations for SEM studies, a sample size 
of 200 (minimum) to 250 (maximum) questionnaires was targeted for this study.  A maximum of 
250 questionnaires compares favorably to MLE recommendations, and provides a small buffer of 
padding should a less than reasonably high response rate be  realized.    
 
Institutional Review Board Application 
Given the intent of this study to minimize risk and optimize benefits to human participants, the 
use of a questionnaire survey instrument, the use of a commercial Internet service to separate the 
principal investigator from any association with the study participants, and the intentional hiding 
of identifiable participant information, exempt status was requested on the Institutional Review 
Board (IRB) application for this study (Dakota State University Research Committee, 2015; 
University of California Irvine Office of Research, 2006).  Following review, the DSU IRB 
granted exempt project approval #2016-2017-117 to this study on February 14, 2017 (Appendix 
E). 
 
Operationalization 
The survey instrument (Appendix B) was operationalized (Appendix I) by the principal 
investigator using the Qualtrics Insight software platform.  Qualtrics then distributed the survey 
and performed the data collection.  A total of 210 questionnaires were collected for this study, 
consisting of 106 IT identities and 104 OT identities.  This compared favorably to the intended 
target of collecting between 200 (minimum) to 250 (maximum) questionnaires for this study. 
 
There were no missing or unknown responses, as the Qualtrics platform seeks to deliver fully 
completed surveys.  The collected data was exported from Qualtrics in CSV format and imported 
into an Excel worksheet for data verification and descriptive analysis.  Following data 
verification and descriptive analysis, the data was exported from Excel in CSV format, imported 
into LISREL, and saved as a LISREL system file (.lsf) format for CFA and SEM analyses.   
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Data Analysis - Descriptive Statistics 
This study makes use of six control variables (Appendix B, Table B2) to control for variance in 
the dependent variable.  The control variables for this study are age, gender, level of education, 
IT/OT identity, years of professional computer experience working in an industry sector, and 
industry sector. Using Excel, a descriptive analysis was performed on the 210 questionnaires 
collected for this study.  The critical moderating influence in this study is the IT or OT identity 
self-prescribed by each participant.  As shown in Table 4, the collected data shows a balance of 
this control variable with 50.48% (n=106) IT identities and 49.52% (n=104) OT identities.   
   
Table 4.  Participant Demographics  
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Gender was not as evenly distributed, with 70.48% (n=148) of the participants identifying as 
male, and 29.52% (n=62) identifying as female.  Age was more evenly distributed with 48.57% 
(n=102) of the participants being age 34 years or younger, and 51.43% (n=108) of the 
participants being age 35 years or older.  43.81% (n=92) of the participants reported having 
earned a bachelor’s degree, with 18.10% (n=38) reporting some level of graduate course work.  
3.81% (n=8) of those indicating some level of graduate coursework reported having earned a 
doctoral degree.   
 
Table 5.  Participant Beliefs (Aggregated Participant Responses)  
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Work experience reflects a young workforce, with 60.95% (n=128) having 10 years or less of 
practical work experience, and 39.05% (n=82) having more than 11 years of work experience.  
Relevance to industry sector was evenly distributed between participants working with the 
extraction or transformation of natural resources 46.67% (n=98), or being a provider of physical 
or knowledge based services 53.3% (n=112).  
 
A composite assessment of the data collected for this study can be found in Appendix F, Figures 
F1 through F10.  Each of the ten figures in Appendix F includes information relative to one of 
the ten research hypotheses, or path hypotheses, depicted in the path diagram shown in Figure 3, 
and listed in Table 3.   As illustrated by the corresponding frequency distribution (Appendix F) 
for each of the 30 manifest variables associated with the measurement model of this study, 
participant responses dominate the right side (Somewhat Agree – Agree – Strongly Agree) of the 
Likert scale.  This finding suggests empirical support for each of the research hypotheses 
associated with the structural model (Table 3).  This sentiment is summarized by the aggregated 
responses shown in Table 5, which aggregates participant responses by the left side of the Likert 
scale (Strongly Disagree – Disagree – Somewhat Disagree), the middle of the Likert Scale 
(Neither Agree nor Disagree), and the right side of the Likert scale (Somewhat Agree – Agree – 
Strongly Agree).  On average, 85.63% of participant responses were recorded on the right side of 
the Likert scale, suggesting a positive association between the research hypotheses and the 
manifest variables associated with the measurement model.  Conditional formatting within Table 
5 is used to highlight aggregated responses less than 80% (yellow), suggesting a weaker path 
hypothesis relationship, and aggregated responses greater than 90% (green), suggesting a 
stronger path hypothesis relationship.  Of the identified relationships, the data suggests 2 
research hypotheses (H3, H9), while positive, are in need of organizational attention.  In 
particular, the data suggests that organizational management should provide visible recognition 
to each authorized user that complies with computer security procedures (H32), while 
recognizing that complying with a comprehensive computer security may require extra effort on 
the part of each authorized user (H92, H93).  
 
The data also suggest that 2 research hypotheses (H4, H10), also positive, are indicative of 
personal  best practices.  In particular, the data suggests that strictly following computer security 
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policies is a recognized best practice (H41), and that there is intent to comply with a 
comprehensive computer security policy, regardless of how others think or act (HA1, HA3).   
 
These findings suggest that there is empirical support for the thesis of this study, that a 
comprehensive computer security policy has a direct effect on human compliance with computer 
security policy, which can be further explained through indirect effects.   
 
Data Analysis – Multivariate Statistics 
Multivariate data analysis techniques performed on the collected data include confirmatory 
factor analysis (CFA) and structural equation modeling (SEM).  CFA and SEM are often used 
together to measure the validity of a research model, to determine whether or not the theoretical 
model fits the actual relationships observed in the research model.  CFA is a statistical test used 
to determine how well the latent variables described by the theoretical model match the reality of 
data gathered by the manifest variables, or study observations.  CFA differs from exploratory 
factor analysis (EFA) in that CFA relies on theory to define latent variables and their 
relationships before the study data is gathered, while EFA relies on statistical output to define 
latent variables and their relationships after the study data is gathered.  SEM is a family of 
statistical models used to explain relationship strength between the latent variables that are 
linked together in a path diagram.  SEM performs this task by examining relationships between 
the independent variables and the dependent variables in a path diagram as a series of equations 
similar to a series of multiple regression equations (Hair et al., 2010a). 
 
CFA and SEM analyses can be performed using one of several computer software packages.  
This study used the LISREL (LInear Structural RELations) computer programming language to 
perform the statistical analyses required for this study.  A 12-month rental license for LISREL 
v9.2 for Windows was purchased from Scientific Software International (SSI, 2017) on February 
5, 2017.   Licensing costs were paid by the principal investigator at personal expense. 
 
While SEM models such as the TPB Base Research Model with Antecedent Constructs depicted 
in Figure 3 are often drawn using a simplified form of notation to describe dependence 
relationships between exogenous and endogenous variables, SEM models can also be drawn 
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using a specific SEM lexicon known as LISREL notation (Appendix D).  Although LISREL  
refers specifically to a widely used computer program for SEM modeling, the LISREL platform 
incorporates a unique lexicon, known as LISREL notation, to depict and describe SEM models in 
minute detail. The use of LISREL notation to describe non-LISREL models and their results is a 
commonly accepted SEM practice (Hair et al., 2010a).  Unfortunately, the LISREL software 
does not automatically generate LISREL notation in its output images.  Instead, each LISREL 
symbol depicted on a LISREL SEM image must be manually inserted.  While it was initially 
anticipated that the LISREL images displayed in this study would include LISREL notation, this 
step was not taken due to the amount of time and effort required to complete this task.  
 
For purpose of SEM modeling, Likert scale responses which represent ordinal data are treated 
within LISREL as continuous data.  Joreskog (2005) contends that each ordinal variable z has an 
underlying continuous variable z* representing the ordinal response. It is the underlying 
continuous variable z* that is used within the LISREL SEM model, not the observed variable z, 
with z* assumed to have a range from -∞ to +∞.  While some researchers within the academic 
community acknowledge the practice of modeling ordinal data as continuous data within a SEM 
model (Hair et al., 2010a; Malhotra et al., 2014), others do not.  For purpose of this study, Likert 
scale ordinal data is treated as continuous data within the LISREL SEM model. 
 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
Appendix G includes an image of the standardized SEM model generated by LISREL for this 
study.  Due to technical difficulty in copying complex screen images from LISREL into Word, 
the image included in this Word document is grainy and difficult to read.  However, the image 
provides a reasonable view of the CFA model produced by this study.  The CFA model suggests 
a less than optimal fit of the structural model to the measurement model.  While the normed χ2 
(χ2 / df) of  4.27 is acceptable, a p-value of 0.000 and an RMSEA of 0.125 are unacceptable.  
Acceptable CFA fit statistics should include a p-value approaching 1.0 and an RMSEA <= 0.08.  
Given this early prognosis, we turn our attention to the SEM model for this study. 
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Model Identification 
SEM identity is associated with degrees of freedom (df).  A model is underidentified if df < 0, 
just-identified if df = 0 and overidentified if df > 0 (Diamantopoulos & Siguaw, 2000; Hair et al., 
2010a).  Identity is an indicator of whether or not the measurement model provides sufficient 
information to obtain a unique solution, as determined by the difference between known 
information and unknown information.  Models that are underidentified are useless, and result in 
a system of equations that cannot be solved.   
 
Models that are just-identified yield a perfect fit, sometimes referred to as a saturated fit, because 
their fit is determined by circumstance. Just-identified models are designated as identified 
(Schumacker & Lomax, 1996) and deemed acceptable (Hair et al., 2010a).  However, just-
identified SEM models are viewed as trivial and do not support scientific usefulness for testing 
theories (Diamantopoulos & Siguaw, 2000; Hair et al., 2010a).   
 
SEM researchers prefer models that are overidentified, models that have more knowns than 
unknowns.  However, even though a model may be proven to be overidentified it may not exhibit 
goodness-of-fit, suggesting that models exhibiting goodness-of-fit represent the phenomena in 
question (Diamantopoulos & Siguaw, 2000; Hair et al., 2010a; Rigdon, 1997).  Diamantopoulos 
& Siguaw contend that changes intended to induce better fit must be theoretically justified, and 
that constraints should never be added randomly to obtain identification.  The authors note that 
“it is better to be known for having developed the correct model (even if you could not get 
estimates of its coefficients) than for having identified and estimated the wrong model (Hayduk, 
1987).”    As such, the SEM model for this study is overidentified, given df = 397 (Appendix H). 
 
Construct Reliability 
Construct reliability (Table 6) was tested using Cronbach’s alpha, composite factor reliability 
(CFR), and average variance expected (AVE).   The results show support for construct reliability 
given that all Cronbach alpha scores are greater than the threshold value of 0.70, all CFR scores 
are greater than the threshold value of 0.70, and all AVE scores are greater than the threshold 
value of 0.50, thereby indicating acceptable construct reliability (Hair et al., 2010a; Zaiontz, 
2017).  It is interesting to note that while LISREL outputs the raw data necessary to calculate 
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Cronbach’s alpha, CFR, and AVE, LISREL does not output the finished score for any of these 
statistics.  Instead, each of the statistics listed in Table 6 was calculated manually using Excel 
(Diamantopoulos & Siguaw, 2000; Zaiontz, 2017). 
 
Table 6.  Construct Reliability 
 
 
Factor Loadings 
Table 7 lists the standardized factor loadings for each manifest variable onto its assigned latent 
variable. As indicated by conditional formatting, all loadings are greater than 0.70 with the 
exception of manifest variables H31 and H93.  This finding indicates support for the structural 
model, with the exception of the latent variables and manifest variables located on indirect path 
CS-PS-SE-IN. 
 
Structural Equation Modeling 
Appendix H includes an image of the unstandardized SEM model generated by LISREL for this 
study.  Due to technical difficulty in copying complex screen images from LISREL into Word, 
the image included in this Word document is grainy and difficult to read.  However, the image 
does provide a reasonable view of the SEM  model produced by this study.  The LISREL model 
for this study includes the following components; a structural model consisting of 8 latent 
variables, a measurement model consisting of 30 manifest variables, 3 indirect paths, 1 direct 
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path, 1 exogenous variable, 7 endogenous variables, and 1 dependent variable.  Each of these 
components is visible in the LISREL model shown in Appendix H. 
 
Table 7.  Standardized Factor Loadings 
 
 
Direct and Indirect Effects 
The thesis of this study is that a comprehensive computer security policy has a direct effect on 
human compliance with computer security policy, which can be further explained through 
indirect effects.  As illustrated by Figure 4 and Appendix H, and listed in Table 8, this SEM 
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model suggests partial mediation of new antecedent constructs SI, RE, PS, and TPB against the 
direct effect of a comprehensive computer security upon intent, indicating that the mediating 
constructs do not fully explain the construct relationships between the latent variables in the 
structural model. 
 
 
Figure 4.  Path Diagram showing Unstandardized Direct and Indirect Effects 
 
Table 8.  Unstandardized Direct and Indirect Effects 
 
 
The unstandardized path coefficients listed in Figure 4, Appendix H, and Table 8 reflect the 
magnitude of change in a dependent variable from a unit change in an independent variable 
(Diamantopoulos & Siguaw, 2000).  The sign of the coefficient indicates the direction of the 
change; positive signs indicate an increase in the dependent variable, while negative signs 
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indicate a decrease in the dependent variable.  Thus, a unit change within indirect paths CS-SI-
NB-IN and CS-RE-AT-IN serves to increase intent to comply with a comprehensive computer 
security policy, while a unit change within indirect path CS-PS-SE-IN serves to decrease intent 
to comply with a comprehensive computer security policy.  A total indirect effect of 0.245 
compared to a direct effect of 0.452 indicates partial mediation, suggesting that the direct effect 
of a comprehensive computer security policy against human intent to comply is stronger than the 
indirect effect of the mediating constructs, thereby supporting the thesis of this study. 
 
Table 9.  Research Model Hypotheses Support 
Hypothesis Label Coefficient p-value Support Description 
1 H1 0.697 0.000 Yes 
An end user’s relationship beliefs about others in regard to 
avoiding NMSV behavior is positively associated with the 
intention to comply with a comprehensive computer 
security policy. 
2 H2 0.620 0.000 Yes 
An end user’s conversations with others in regard to 
complying with a comprehensive computer security policy 
are positively associated with the intention to comply with 
a comprehensive computer security policy. 
3 H3 0.512 0.000 Yes 
Penalties that emphasize the enterprise benefit and end 
user benefit of avoiding NMSV behavior are positively 
associated with the intention to comply with a 
comprehensive computer security policy. 
4 H4 0.261 0.000 Yes 
An end user’s relationship beliefs about others in regard to 
avoiding NMSV behavior enhances the normative belief to 
avoid NMSV behavior and is positively associated with the 
intention to comply with a comprehensive computer 
security policy.  
5 H5 0.993 0.000 Yes 
An end user’s conversations with others in regard to 
complying with a comprehensive computer security policy 
enhances end user attitude toward complying with a 
comprehensive computer security policy and are positively 
associated with the intention to comply with a 
comprehensive computer security policy. 
6 H6 1.363 0.000 Yes 
Penalties that emphasize the enterprise benefit and end 
user benefit of avoiding NMSV behavior enhance end user 
self-efficacy toward complying with a comprehensive 
computer security policy and are positively associated with 
the intention to comply with a comprehensive computer 
security policy. 
7 H7 0.521 0.035 Yes 
An end user’s normative beliefs toward a comprehensive 
computer security policy are positively associated with 
their intention to comply with a comprehensive computer 
security policy. 
8 H8 0.357 0.000 Yes An end user’s attitude toward a comprehensive computer 
security policy is positively associated with their intention 
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to comply with a comprehensive computer security policy. 
9 H9 (0.099) 0.112 No 
An end user’s self-efficacy beliefs toward a comprehensive 
computer security policy are positively associated with 
their intention to comply with a comprehensive computer 
security policy. 
10 H10 0.452 0.000 Yes 
An end user’s understanding of the enterprise benefits and 
personal benefits associated with a comprehensive 
computer security policy positively affects their volitional 
control and intention to comply with a comprehensive 
computer security policy. 
 
The study results listed in Table 9 indicate statistical support for 9 of the 10 research hypotheses, 
or path hypotheses, pursued by this study.  With the exception of hypothesis 9, (H9), each of the 
research hypotheses listed in Table 9 indicates a positive association with intention to comply 
with a comprehensive computer security policy, and is statistically significant with a p-value < 
0.05.  Study results indicate that hypothesis 9, (H9), is not supported due to a negative 
association with intention to comply with a comprehensive computer security policy and a p-
value > 0.05.  This finding suggests that despite an awareness of the benefit associated with 
comprehensive computer security compliance, the act of being in compliance may require more 
effort than is perceived as practical.   
 
Goodness-of-Fit Measurement 
SEM model goodness-of-fit (GOF) measurement compares theory to reality by comparing the 
difference between the estimated covariance matrix (structural model), or theory, to the observed 
covariance matrix (measurement model), or reality  (Hair et al., 2010a).  If the modeled theory is 
perfect, then a comparison of the estimated covariance matrix and the observed covariance 
matrix will show no difference, or a perfect fit, between the two matrices.  Any observed 
variance between the estimated covariance  matrix and the observed covariance matrix indicates 
a less than perfect fit, with the difference between the two matrices being an indicator of the 
goodness-of-fit.   
 
For SEM models, the implied null hypothesis is that there is no difference between the estimated 
covariance matrix, or theory, to the observed covariance matrix, or reality, meaning that the 
research model is a good fit with reality.  The test statistic used to measure variance between the 
two matrices is the chi-square statistic (χ2).  Given that the value of χ2 increases as the variance 
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between the two matrices increases, we also reference the p-value associated with the χ2 test to 
assess the equality of estimated covariance matrix and the observed covariance matrix, within a 
given population (Hair et al., 2010a).  This leads to desired critical values of a relatively small χ2 
value that approaches zero (0),  and a correspondingly large p-value >= 0.05 that approaches one 
(1).  Therefore, the objective of a SEM model χ2 GOF test is to accept the null hypothesis by 
observing a small χ2 value that approaches zero, and a correspondingly large p-value >= 0.05 that 
approaches one, thereby indicating that the research model is a good fit with reality (Table 10). 
 
Table 10.  SEM Model Test Hypotheses and Test Statistics 
Test Hypotheses Test 
Statistics 
Critical Values 
H0: Theoretical model fits the observed model; 
there are no significant differences between the 
estimated and observed  covariance matrices.  
Theory matches reality. 
χ
2
 
p-value 
 
Small χ
2
 approaching zero 
p-value >=  0.05 approaching one 
 
Ha: Theoretical model does not fit the observed 
model; there are significant differences between 
the estimated and observed covariance matrices.  
Theory does not match reality. 
χ
2
 
p-value 
 
Large χ
2
 approaching one 
p-value < 0.05 approaching zero 
 
 
Given the test statistics for this SEM model of χ2 = 1858.19, df = 397, and p-value of 0.00 
(Appendix H), the null hypothesis is rejected in favor of the alternate hypothesis; there are 
significant differences between the estimated and observed covariance matrices.  Theory does 
not match reality for this particular model. 
 
However, Hair et al. (2010a) contend that “the researcher should report at least one incremental 
index and one absolute index in addition to χ2 and df.”  This is due to known problems fitting χ2 
to SEM models with a large number of indicators, and the practice of looking at fit indices across 
a wide range of situations.  Accordingly, Table 11 lists additional absolute and incremental 
indices for the SEM model produced by this research.  Despite rejection of null hypothesis for 
this study due to the χ2 test previously discussed, the absolute index of normed χ2 (χ2 / df) 
indicates that the SEM model produced by this research is significant with a value of 4.681.  In 
addition, standardized root mean residual (SRMR) indicates significance with a value of 0.057.  
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Other absolute indices of root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) and goodness-of-fit 
(GFI) fail, with values of 0.132 and 0.644 respectively. 
 
Table 11.  SEM Model Goodness-of-Fit Indices 
 
 
Both of the incremental indices reported for this study fail to indicate significance.  Neither the 
comparative fit index (CFI) or the normed fit index (NFI) indicate significance with values of 
0.808 and 0.769 respectively.  Thus, given the originally stated test statistics of χ2 and p-value, 
combined with failure of 4 of 6 additional goodness-of-fit tests, the initial rejection of the null 
hypothesis in favor of the alternate hypothesis stands; there are significant differences between 
the estimated and observed covariance matrices.  Theory does not match reality for this 
particular model. 
 
Limitations 
SEM and LISREL  
The selection of SEM as a research methodology and LISREL as a SEM modeling tool 
represents a significant undertaking for a first-time research project.  SEM requires a solid 
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understanding of relevant domain theory, factor analysis, multiple regression, matrix algebra, 
and measurement scales.  LISREL is a complex software program that provides a limited support 
model.  Aligning a LISREL model with SEM conventions requires a significant amount of 
LISREL knowledge and expertise, as much of learning how to use LISREL and interpreting its 
output is left to the researcher to decipher.  As a result, practical LISREL knowledge for this 
study was gathered from email conversations with Dr. Gerhard Mels at SSI, the LISREL 
application help system, books purchased over the Internet, published research, discussions with 
SEM practitioners, and explanatory videos found on YouTube.   The rapid pace of learning 
resulted in a few misunderstandings, and the need to retrace some initial steps to correct 
misinterpreted results. 
 
Sacrificing Theory for Reality 
Based on LISREL output,  statistical goodness-of-fit for the SEM model was not achieved.  As a 
result, the null hypothesis was rejected in favor of the alternate hypothesis indicating that there 
are significant differences between the estimated and observed covariance matrices.  Unadvised 
but fueled by curiosity, several attempts were made to restructure the manifest variables in an 
effort to produce a measurement model that aligned with the structural model.  While some of 
these efforts yielded promising results, most resulted in abnormalities such as Heywood cases.  
Mindful of academic integrity, and the understanding that changes intended to induce a better fit 
must be theoretically justified, efforts to restructure the measurement model to better fit the 
structural model were discontinued and discarded.   
 
While it is tempting to pursue solutions within the measurement model to better fit the structural 
model, this is the wrong path to follow.  By design, SEM models are based on theoretical 
substance and poor fitting SEM models should be reevaluated from a theoretical perspective, not 
a data perspective.  In practice, it is difficult to produce a good fitting model (Diamantopoulos & 
Siguaw, 2000; Hair et al., 2010a).  Diamantopoulos & Siguaw note that “it is better to be known 
for having developed the correct model (even if you could not get estimates of its coefficients) 
than for having identified and estimated the wrong model (Hayduk, 1987).” 
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Generalizability 
The target population for this study was experienced, industry based, authorized users located in 
the United States.   Future studies would benefit from broadening the target population to include 
authorized users from a global population. 
 
Findings and Contribution 
Findings 
Empirical findings indicate an average of 85.63% of participant responses (Table 5) were 
recorded on the right side of the Likert scale, suggesting a positive association between the 
research hypotheses and the manifest variables associated with the measurement model.  In 
particular, the data suggests that organizational management should provide visible recognition 
to each authorized user that complies with computer security procedures, while recognizing that 
complying with comprehensive computer security procedures may require extra effort on the part 
of each authorized user.  Two additional research hypotheses, also positive, suggest personal  
best practices.  In particular, the data suggests that strictly following computer security policies is 
a recognized best practice, and that there is intent to comply with a comprehensive computer 
security policy, regardless of how others think or act.   
 
The LISREL output for this study states that the SEM model is overidentified, an indicator that 
the measurement model provides sufficient information to obtain a unique solution.  LISREL 
output also shows support for construct reliability (Table 6) based on acceptable scores for 
Cronbach’s alpha, CFR and AVE.  This finding is reflected in the statistical support for 9 of the 
10 research hypotheses, or path hypotheses, pursued by this study.  With the exception of the 
focus on sanctions and self-efficacy  (H9), each of the research hypotheses (Table 9) indicates a 
positive association with intention to comply with a comprehensive computer security policy, 
and is statistically significant with a p-value < 0.05.  Study results indicate that the focus on 
sanctions and self-efficacy, (H9), is not supported due to a negative association with intention to 
comply with a comprehensive computer security policy and a p-value > 0.05.  This finding 
suggests that despite an awareness of the benefit associated with comprehensive computer 
security compliance, the act of compliance requiring more effort than is perceived as practical.   
 
doctoral dissertation final defense ACUNA v5.3 Page 50 of 97 
 
Study findings indicate partial mediation of indirect effects compared to the direct effect of a 
comprehensive computer security policy on human intent to comply with computer security 
policy.  This finding suggests that the direct effect of a comprehensive computer security policy 
against human intent to comply is stronger than the indirect effect of the mediating constructs, 
thereby supporting the thesis of this study. 
 
However, the measurement model does not fully align with the structural model given the 
goodness-of-fit indices (Table 11) produced by LISREL.  Thus, given the originally stated test 
statistics of χ2 and p-value, combined with the failure of several additional goodness-of-fit tests, 
the initial rejection of the null hypothesis in favor of the alternate hypothesis stands firm; there 
are significant differences between the estimated and observed covariance matrices.  Theory 
does not match reality for this particular model. 
 
Contribution 
Despite the statistically insignificant results for this particular SEM model, this study delivers 
several contributions that serve to encourage future work that will benefit researchers and 
practitioners in alike.   
 
First, this research represents a unique contribution to IS literature in that no peer reviewed 
research was found that explained the direct effect of a comprehensive computer security policy 
on human computer security compliance through an understanding of its indirect effects.  The 
SEM model for this study is based on the convergence of IT computer security with OT 
computer security, and future discovery of statistically significant results in this problem space 
will provide researchers with a descriptive understanding of the direct and indirect effects on 
human intention to comply with a comprehensive computer security policy.   
 
Second, this research is timely in that modern computer threats and computer vulnerabilities are 
evolving rapidly and are capable of introducing significant computer risk to both the IT computer 
domain and the OT computer domain.  Recognition of this phenomenon is underscored by the 
notion that theory is not the exclusive domain of academia, but can also be found in the 
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experience and practice gathered through the observation of real world behavior (Hair et al., 
2010a; Lee, 1999).   
 
Third, discovery of statistically significant results in this problem space will help drive the 
prescriptive application of a shared, comprehensive computer security policy which will have a 
positive impact on computer security awareness.  Improved computer security awareness, 
leading to a better understanding of the practical benefits of compliance with a shared, 
comprehensive computer security policy, will help manage the resistance to change that is often 
encountered when change alters the perception of power in regard to those who lose power and 
those who gain power.  An increase in computer security awareness and understanding will 
contribute to an increase in personal intent to comply with such a policy, resulting in the direct 
effect of reduced human error and fewer occurrences of NMSVs.  
 
Lastly, discovery of statistically significant results in this problem space and the practical 
application of those findings will benefit the enterprise by helping to develop a comprehensive 
culture of computer security by incorporating enterprise scope and ownership of computer 
security into a single, overarching policy that binds all humans in the enterprise to a common 
cause. Future discovery of statistically significant findings will reinforce Schein’s (2004) 
contention that culture is an abstraction, and that organizations need to understand the forces that 
result from social and organizational situations lest they fall victim to them.  In addition, the 
findings will contribute to the ongoing development and persistence of organizational culture as 
defined by Schein; “a pattern of shared basic assumptions that was learned by a group as it 
solved its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, that has worked well enough 
to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to 
perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems.”   
 
Conclusion 
Although this study did not produce a statistically significant SEM model, it did yield empirical 
findings that suggest there is practical support for the thesis of this study, that a comprehensive 
computer security policy has a direct effect on human compliance with computer security policy, 
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which can be further explained through indirect effects.  As a result, it is the intent of the 
principal investigator to continue this research in the form of future work. 
 
Future Work 
This study represents a promising first effort at using SEM to understand the phenomena of 
direct and indirect effects of a comprehensive computer security policy on human compliance 
with computer security policy.  Table 12 lists recommended future work activities to further 
develop this research. 
 
Table 12.  Recommended Future Work Activities 
Activity Future Work Description 
1 Analyze the collected data for moderating effects of the control variables. 
2 
Perform EFA on the collected data to discover unknown relationships 
between latent variables and manifest variables. 
3 Revisit the structural model for soundness of theory. 
4 Revisit the measurement model for soundness of scale. 
5 Design an overidentified SEM model. 
6 Perform a new data collection using the redesigned measurement model. 
7 Perform new CFA and SEM analyses using the newly collected data. 
8 
Evaluate the new CFA and SEM results using incremental indices and 
absolute indices. 
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Appendix B - Survey Instrument 
 
Figure B1.  7-Point Likert Scales 
 
Table B1.  Survey Scenarios 
Scenario Tag Theory Description (effect) 
Identity and awareness of 
a comprehensive 
computer security policy 
SC1 
SIT, INT, 
DET 
(Indirect) I understand a comprehensive computer 
security policy.  For various reasons it  is important that 
my co-workers and I comply with this policy.  
Mapping of antecedent 
constructs to TPB 
constructs 
SC2 
SIT, INT, 
DET, TPB 
(Indirect) My thoughts and actions, peer relationships, 
and known deterrents  affect my intention to comply 
with a comprehensive computer security policy. 
My intent to comply with 
a comprehensive 
computer security policy 
SC3 TPB 
(Indirect) Based on my beliefs, attitude, and self-
efficacy, I intend to comply with a comprehensive 
computer security policy.  
Volitional control and 
direct intent to comply 
with a comprehensive 
computer security policy 
SC4 TPB 
(Direct) Through my personal awareness of and 
personal understanding of a comprehensive computer 
security policy, I have the ability to comply with a 
comprehensive computer security policy. 
 
Table B2.  Control Variables 
Demographic Tag Description 
Age AGE Age 
Gender GEN Gender assigned at birth; male / female 
Level of Education EDU Highest level of education attained 
IT/OT Identity XTD Current job identifies most closely with IT or OT 
Computer Experience CEX 
Total years’ experience working as a computer 
practitioner in an industry sector 
Industry IDS Industry sector 
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Table B3.  Survey Questions 
Hypothesis Scenario Tag Question Scale Source 
H1 
SC1 H11 
My coworkers agree that I should 
comply with this new policy. 
Likert 
Belief 
(Guo et al., 2011) 
Workgroup norm 
SC1 H12 
My coworkers will think that I should 
comply with the new computer security 
policy. 
Likert 
Belief 
(Guo et al., 2011) 
Workgroup norm 
SC1 H13 
My supervisor will want me to comply 
with this new policy. 
Likert 
Belief 
(Guo et al., 2011) 
Workgroup norm 
H2 
SC1 H21 
It is important that I convince my 
coworkers to comply with the new 
computer security policy. 
Likert 
Belief 
Principal Investigator 
SC1 H22 My coworkers rely on my opinion. 
Likert 
Belief 
Principal Investigator 
SC1 H23 
This new policy is important and others 
need to know how I feel about it. 
Likert 
Belief 
Principal Investigator 
H3 
SC1 H31 
I will be reprimanded if my organization 
is aware of my non-secure actions. 
Likert 
Belief 
(Guo et al., 2011) 
Sanctions 
SC1 H32 
My management notices when I follow 
security procedures, and encourages 
me to keep doing a good job! 
Likert 
Belief 
(Guo et al., 2011) 
Sanctions 
SC1 H33 
I am encouraged when the company 
notices I am following security 
procedures. 
Likert 
Belief 
(Guo et al., 2011) 
Sanctions 
H4 
SC2 H41 
As an IT professional, I have to do 
certain things on my job. Strictly 
following computer security policies is 
one of them. 
Likert 
Belief 
(Guo et al., 2011) 
Identity match 
SC2 H42 
Following computer security rules and 
policies is an important part of my work 
as an IT professional. 
Likert 
Belief 
(Guo et al., 2011) 
Identity match 
SC2 H43 
Breaking security policies hurts my 
image as a business professional. 
Likert 
Belief 
(Guo et al., 2011) 
Identity match 
H5 
SC2 H51 
This security policy helps to secure 
information systems. 
Likert 
Belief 
(Guo et al., 2011) 
Attitude 
SC2 H52 
This security policy is absolutely 
necessary. 
Likert 
Belief 
(Guo et al., 2011) 
Attitude 
SC2 H53 This security policy is important. 
Likert 
Belief 
(Guo et al., 2011) 
Attitude 
H6 SC2 H61 
I understand the risks posed by poor 
security and that I may be reprimanded 
if I don’t comply with policy. 
Likert 
Belief 
(Flores & Ekstedt, 
2016) 
Awareness 
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SC2 H62 
I am aware of the potential threats and 
negative consequences that are 
possible if I don’t follow the proper 
security procedures.  
Likert 
Belief 
(Flores & Ekstedt, 
2016) 
Awareness 
SC2 H63 
It is important that I follow the rules for 
keeping my organization secure so that I 
don’t get into trouble. 
Likert 
Belief 
(Flores & Ekstedt, 
2016) 
Awareness 
H7 
SC3 H71 
My co-workers and I agree that 
complying with the new policy is the 
right thing to do. 
Likert 
Belief 
(Guo et al., 2011) 
Workgroup norm 
SC3 H72 
It is important to me that my co-
workers comply with the new policy. 
Likert 
Belief 
(Guo et al., 2011) 
Workgroup norm 
SC3 H73 
It is important that my co-workers know 
that I intend to comply with the new 
computer security policy. 
Likert 
Belief 
(Guo et al., 2011) 
Workgroup norm 
H8 
SC3 H81 
I believe that complying with the new 
security policy is a good idea. 
Likert 
Belief 
(Guo et al., 2011) 
Attitude 
SC3 H82 
I think that complying with the new 
security policy is the right thing to do. 
Likert 
Belief 
(Guo et al., 2011) 
Attitude 
SC3 H83 
By complying with the new security 
policy I am helping the company stay 
secure from computer threats. 
Likert 
Belief 
(Guo et al., 2011) 
Attitude 
H9 
SC3 H91 
Complying with the new policy helps to 
improve my job performance. 
Likert 
Belief 
(Guo et al., 2011) 
Performance 
SC3 H92 
Complying with the new policy lets me 
perform my tasks more effectively. 
Likert 
Belief 
(Guo et al., 2011) 
Performance 
SC3 H93 
Complying with the new policy makes it 
easier for me to do my job. 
Likert 
Belief 
(Guo et al., 2011) 
Performance 
H10 
SC4 H101 
I am confident that I will comply with 
the new computer security policy. 
Likert 
Belief 
Principal Investigator 
SC4 H102 
I understand the benefits of the new 
computer security policy and I intend to 
comply with it. 
Likert 
Belief 
Principal Investigator 
SC4 H103 
Regardless of how others think or act, I 
intend to comply with the new 
computer security policy. 
Likert 
Belief 
Principal Investigator 
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Appendix C – TPB Construct References 
 
Table C1.  Conceptual Definition of TPB Constructs (Bulgurcu et al., 2010) 
Construct Determinant Definition 
ISP Awareness Antecedent 
A construct structured as independent variables leading 
to the dependent construct of IS Awareness. 
General 
Awareness 
Antecedent 
A construct structured as independent variables leading 
to the dependent construct of IS Awareness. 
IS Awareness Antecedent 
A construct structured as independent variables leading 
to dependent constructs within the Belief About 
Outcome construct and dependent constructs within the 
TPB model. 
Beliefs About 
Outcomes 
Antecedent 
Framework that encapsulates several constructs 
structured as independent variables leading to 
dependent constructs within the Belief About Overall 
Assessment of Consequences construct. 
Beliefs About 
Overall 
Assessment of 
Consequences 
Antecedent 
Framework that encapsulates several constructs 
structured as independent variables leading to 
dependent constructs within the TPB model. 
Attitude toward 
compliance with 
IS Policy 
Independent 
The degree to which the performance of the compliance 
behavior is positively valued 
Normative Beliefs Independent 
An employee’s perceived social pressure about 
compliance with the requirements of the ISP caused by 
behavioral expectations of such important referents as 
executives, colleagues, and managers. 
Self-Efficacy to 
Comply 
Independent 
An employee’s judgment of personal skills, knowledge, 
or competency about fulfilling the requirements of the 
ISP. 
Intention to 
Comply 
Dependent 
An employee’s intention to protect the information and 
technology resources of the organization from potential 
security breaches 
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Table C2.  Conceptual Definition of TPB Constructs (Dinev & Hu, 2007) 
Construct Determinant Definition 
Technology 
Awareness 
Antecedent 
A construct structured as an independent variable 
leading to a dependent variable within the TPB model. 
Perceived 
Usefulness 
Antecedent A construct structured as an independent variable 
leading to a dependent variable within the TPB model. 
Perceived Ease of 
Use 
Antecedent A construct structured as an independent variable 
leading to a dependent variable within the TPB model. 
Self-Efficacy 
Antecedent A construct structured as an independent variable 
leading to a dependent variable within the TPB model. 
Controllability 
Antecedent A construct structured as an independent variable 
leading to a dependent variable within the TPB model. 
Attitude Toward 
the Behavior 
Independent 
Refers to a person’s judgement about whether it is good 
or bad to perform a behavior of interest. 
Subjective Norm Independent 
A person’s perception of the social pressure to perform 
or not perform the behavior in question. 
Perceived 
Behavioral 
Control 
Independent 
The perceived ease or difficulty of performing a 
behavior and a personal sense of control over one’s 
performance. 
Intention Dependent Intention to perform the behavior of interest. 
 
Table C3.  Conceptual Definition of TPB Constructs (Flores & Ekstedt, 2016) 
Construct Determinant Definition 
Organizational 
Structure 
Antecedent 
Framework that encapsulates two constructs structured 
as independent variables leading to dependent 
construct of Information Security Awareness and to 
dependent constructs within the TPB model. 
Information 
Security 
Awareness 
Antecedent 
Framework that encapsulates several constructs 
structured as independent variables leading to 
dependent constructs within the TPB model. 
Attitude Independent 
The degree to which the performance of the 
information security behavior is positively valued.   
Normative Belief Independent 
An employee’s perceived social pressure about his/her 
social engineering security behavior caused by 
behavioral expectations of such important referents as 
executives, colleagues and managers.  
Self-Efficacy Independent 
An employee’s judgment of personal skills, knowledge, 
or competency about resisting social engineering.   
Intention Dependent An employee’s intention to resist social engineering. 
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Table C4.  Conceptual Definition of TPB Constructs (Guo et al., 2011) 
Construct Determinant Definition 
Attitude Toward 
Security Policy 
Antecedent 
A construct structured as an independent variable 
leading to a dependent variable within the TPB model. 
Utilitarian 
Outcomes 
Antecedent 
Framework that encapsulates several constructs 
structured as independent variables leading to 
dependent constructs within the TPB model. 
Attitude toward 
NMSV 
Independent 
End users’ evaluation of security violations in terms of 
their degree of favor or disfavor. Users who have a 
positive attitude toward an NMSV would have a greater 
intention to engage in such violations. 
Normative 
Outcome 
Independent 
The approval or disapproval that end users’ peers are 
expected to express in relation to the behavior in 
question. 
Self-Identity 
Outcome 
Independent 
Affirmations or repudiations of self-concept that are 
anticipated to follow from engaging in a behavior. 
Intention Dependent 
NMSV intentions are user tendencies to voluntarily 
engage in actions that violate organizational security 
policies. An indication of how much effort a user plans 
to exert to perform the behavior. 
 
Table C5.  Conceptual Definition of TPB Constructs (Pavlou & Fygenson, 2006) 
Construct Determinant Definition 
External Beliefs 
(getting info) 
Antecedent 
Framework that encapsulates several constructs 
structured as independent variables leading to 
dependent constructs within the TPB model. 
External Beliefs 
(purchasing) 
Antecedent 
Framework that encapsulates several constructs 
structured as independent variables leading to 
dependent constructs within the TPB model. 
Attitude toward 
Getting Info / 
Purchasing 
Independent 
Attitude toward getting information about a product 
from a vendor’s website in the next 30 days / 
purchasing a product from a vendor’s web site in the 
next 30 days. 
Subjective Norm 
on Getting Info / 
Purchasing 
Independent 
Suggests that individual desire to act is based on the 
perception of how significant others perceived an 
individual’s actions.  
Perceived 
Behavioral 
Control Getting 
Info / Purchasing 
Independent 
An individual’s perception of how easy or how difficult it 
is to carry out a behavior. 
Intention Dependent An individual’s intention to perform a behavior. 
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Table C6.  Conceptual Definition of TPB Constructs (Song & Zahedi, 2005) 
Construct Determinant Definition 
Perceived 
Existence of Web 
Design Elements 
Antecedent 
Framework that encapsulates several constructs 
structured as independent variables leading to 
dependent constructs within the Belief About and 
Evaluation / Motivation construct. 
Belief About and 
Evaluation / 
Motivation 
Antecedent 
Framework that encapsulates several constructs 
structured as independent variables leading to 
dependent constructs within the TPB model. 
Attitude Independent 
A web shopper’s attitude toward perceived price and 
perceived service.   
External 
Subjective Norm 
Independent 
The social influences effecting the purchasing decisions 
of a web shopper.  
Perceived 
Behavioral 
Control 
Independent 
A web shopper’s beliefs regarding their ability to use an 
online web site to complete a purchase. 
Purchase 
Intention 
Dependent 
The probability and willingness of a web shopper to 
complete a purchase using online services. 
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Appendix D – LISREL Notation 
 
Table D1 – LISREL Elements (Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2010b)
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Table D2 – LISREL Element Pronunciation (Hair et al., 2010b) 
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Appendix E – DSU IRB Exempt Project Approval 
 
DSU  Institutional Review Board 
Exempt Project Approval 
 
To:   Dennis Acuna 
 
Date:  February 14, 2017 
 
Project Title:   Effects of a Comprehensive Computer Security Policy on Human Computer Security 
Policy Compliance 
 
 
Approval #: 2016-2017-117 
 
The IRB has determined that your project is exempt from the policy for the protection of human 
subjects in research as described in 45 CFR 46.101 (b).  The activity proposed in your protocol is 
applicable to one of the category (categories) stated below:  
 
 (2) Research involving the use of educational tests (cognitive, diagnostic, aptitude, 
achievement), survey procedures, interview procedures or observation of public behavior, 
unless: (i) information obtained is recorded in such a manner that human subjects can be 
identified, directly or through identifiers linked to the subjects; and (ii) any disclosure of the 
human subjects' responses outside the research could reasonably place the subjects at risk of 
criminal or civil liability or be damaging to the subjects' financial standing, employability, or 
reputation. 
 
If there are any unanticipated problems involving risks to subjects or others, or changes in the 
procedures during the study, please contact irb@dsu.edu.    
 
If I can be of further assistance, don’t hesitate to let me know. 
 
Yours truly, 
 
 
 
 
Dr. Jack Walters, Chair 
DSU Institutional Review Board 
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Appendix F – Composite Statistics by Research Hypotheses 
 
An end user’s relationship beliefs about others in regard to avoiding NMSV behavior is positively associated with the intention 
to comply with a comprehensive computer security policy. 
H1 
Social 
Identity (SI) 
H11 
My coworkers agree 
that I should comply 
with this new policy. 
 
Social 
Identity (SI) 
H12 
My coworkers will think 
that I should comply 
with the new computer 
security policy. 
 
Social 
Identity (SI) 
H13 
My supervisor will want 
me to comply with this 
new policy. 
 
 
Figure F1 – Research Hypothesis H1 
 
 
An end user’s conversations with others in regard to complying with a comprehensive computer security policy are positively 
associated with the intention to comply with a comprehensive computer security policy. 
H2 
Resistance 
(RE) 
H21 
It is important that I 
convince my coworkers 
to comply with the new 
computer security 
policy.  
Resistance 
(RE) 
H22 
My coworkers rely on 
my opinion. 
 
Resistance 
(RE) 
H23 
This new policy is 
important and others 
need to know how I 
feel about it. 
 
 
Figure F2 – Research Hypothesis H2 
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Penalties that emphasize the enterprise benefit and end user benefit of avoiding NMSV behavior are positively associated with 
the intention to comply with a comprehensive computer security policy. 
H3 
Sanctions 
(PS) 
H31 
I will be reprimanded if 
my organization is 
aware of my non-
secure actions. 
 
Sanctions 
(PS) 
H32 
My management 
notices when I follow 
security procedures, 
and encourages me to 
keep doing a good job!  
Sanctions 
(PS) 
H33 
I am encouraged when 
the company notices I 
am following security 
procedures. 
 
 
Figure F3 – Research Hypothesis H3 
 
 
An end user’s relationship beliefs about others in regard to avoiding NMSV behavior enhances the normative belief to avoid 
NMSV behavior and is positively associated with the intention to comply with a comprehensive computer security policy. 
H4 
Normative 
Beliefs (NB) 
H41 
As an IT professional, I 
have to do certain 
things on my job. 
Strictly following 
computer security 
policies is one of them.  
Normative 
Beliefs (NB) 
H42 
Following computer 
security rules and 
policies is an important 
part of my work as an 
IT professional.  
Normative 
Beliefs (NB) 
H43 
Breaking security 
policies hurts my image 
as a business 
professional. 
 
 
Figure F4 – Research Hypothesis H4 
 
  
doctoral dissertation final defense ACUNA v5.3 Page 74 of 97 
 
An end user’s conversations with others in regard to complying with a comprehensive computer security policy enhances end 
user attitude toward complying with a comprehensive computer security policy and are positively associated with the intention 
to comply with a comprehensive computer security policy. 
H5 
Attitude 
(AT) 
H51 
This security policy 
helps to secure 
information systems. 
 
Attitude 
(AT) 
H52 
This security policy is 
absolutely necessary. 
 
Attitude 
(AT) 
H53 
This security policy is 
important. 
 
 
Figure F5 – Research Hypothesis H5 
 
 
Penalties that emphasize the enterprise benefit and end user benefit of avoiding NMSV behavior enhance end user self-efficacy 
toward complying with a comprehensive computer security policy and are positively associated with the intention to comply 
with a comprehensive computer security policy. 
H6 
Self-Efficacy 
(SE) 
H61 
I understand the risks 
posed by poor security 
and that I may be 
reprimanded if I don’t 
comply with policy.  
Self-Efficacy 
(SE) 
H62 
I am aware of the 
potential threats and 
negative consequences 
that are possible if I 
don’t follow the proper 
security procedures.   
Self-Efficacy 
(SE) 
H63 
It is important that I 
follow the rules for 
keeping my 
organization secure so 
that I don’t get into 
trouble.  
 
Figure F6 – Research Hypothesis H6 
 
  
doctoral dissertation final defense ACUNA v5.3 Page 75 of 97 
 
An end user’s normative beliefs toward a comprehensive computer security policy are positively associated with their intention 
to comply with a comprehensive computer security policy. 
H7 
Intent to 
Comply (IN) 
H71 
My co-workers and I 
agree that complying 
with the new policy is 
the right thing to do. 
 
Intent to 
Comply (IN) 
H72 
It is important to me 
that my co-workers 
comply with the new 
policy. 
 
Intent to 
Comply (IN) 
H73 
It is important that my 
co-workers know that I 
intend to comply with 
the new computer 
security policy.  
 
Figure F7 – Research Hypothesis H7 
 
 
 
 
An end user’s attitude toward a comprehensive computer security policy is positively associated with their intention to comply 
with a comprehensive computer security policy. 
H8 
Intent to 
Comply (IN) 
H81 
I believe that complying 
with the new security 
policy is a good idea. 
 
Intent to 
Comply (IN) 
H82 
I think that complying 
with the new security 
policy is the right thing 
to do. 
 
Intent to 
Comply (IN) 
H83 
By complying with the 
new security policy I am 
helping the company 
stay secure from 
computer threats.  
 
Figure F8 – Research Hypothesis H8 
 
  
doctoral dissertation final defense ACUNA v5.3 Page 76 of 97 
 
An end user’s self-efficacy beliefs toward a comprehensive computer security policy are positively associated with their 
intention to comply with a comprehensive computer security policy. 
H9 
Intent to 
Comply (IN) 
H91 
Complying with the 
new policy helps to 
improve my job 
performance. 
 
Intent to 
Comply (IN) 
H92 
Complying with the 
new policy lets me 
perform my tasks more 
effectively. 
 
Intent to 
Comply (IN) 
H93 
Complying with the 
new policy makes it 
easier for me to do my 
job. 
 
 
Figure F9 – Research Hypothesis H9 
 
 
An end user’s understanding of the enterprise benefits and personal benefits associated with a comprehensive computer 
security policy positively affects their volitional control and intention to comply with a comprehensive computer security policy. 
H10 
Computer 
Security 
Policy (CS) 
HA1 
I am confident that I 
will comply with the 
new computer security 
policy. 
 
Computer 
Security 
Policy (CS) 
HA2 
I understand the 
benefits of the new 
computer security 
policy and I intend to 
comply with it.  
Computer 
Security 
Policy (CS) 
HA3 
Regardless of how 
others think or act, I 
intend to comply with 
the new computer 
security policy.  
 
Figure F10 – Research Hypothesis H10  
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Appendix G – LISREL Standardized CFA Multi-Factor Model 
 
 
 
  
doctoral dissertation final defense ACUNA v5.3 Page 78 of 97 
 
Appendix H – LISREL Unstandardized SEM Model  
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Appendix I – Survey Operationalization 
 
Q1 To the survey participant: 
 
I am conducting a research study titled “Effects of a Comprehensive Computer Security Policy 
on Human Computer Security Policy Compliance”, as part of a doctoral dissertation program at 
Dakota State University (DSU). 
 
The purpose of this study is to learn more about the theoretical factors that influence human 
intent to comply with a computer security policy. 
 
You are invited to participate in this study by completing the attached questionnaire.   Your time 
is valuable and I have attempted to keep this effort as brief as possible.  Completing this 
questionnaire should take no more than 30 minutes of your time. 
 
Your participation in this study is voluntary.  You may withdraw at any time without 
consequence. 
 
There are no known risks to you by participating in this study.   While there are no known direct 
benefits to you, there may be some indirect benefits by learning more about the factors 
associated with a computer security policy. 
 
Your questionnaire responses are strictly confidential.  When the data and analysis are presented, 
you will not be linked to the data by your name, title, electronic address or any other identifying 
item. 
 
Your consent to participate in this study is implied by the return of your completed 
questionnaire. 
 
Please keep this letter for your information.  If you have any questions regarding your rights as a 
participant in this study, you may contact the DSU Office of Sponsored Programs at (605)-256-
5100 or at irb@dsu.edu. 
 
Thank you for your time and assistance. 
 
Sincerely 
 
Dennis Acuna 
Principal Investigator 
 
DSU Office of Sponsored Programs 
(605)-256-5100 
irb@dsu.edu 
 
This project has been approved by the DSU Institutional Review Board, Approval #:  2016-
2017-117 
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 YES, I consent to participate in this study. (1) 
 NO, I do not consent to participate in this study. (2) 
Condition: NO, I do not consent to par... Is Selected. Skip To: End of Block. 
Q2 During this study, you will be asked to select Information Technology (IT) or 
Operational Technology (OT) as your authorized user identity, based on your 
PRIMARY  job function.  
 
Information Technology (IT) Identity  
You must be an authorized user at the place where you work. This means you have been given 
credentials to access proprietary computer systems that are not available to the public.  
 
You WORK PRIMARILY with information  systems that are used to support general 
organizational processes.Some examples of general organizational processes are accounting, 
finance, procurement, marketing, human resources, and information technology, among others.  
 
Examples of information systems you might work with include (but are not limited to):   
Personal Computer (PC) based systems such as Microsoft Office (Word, Excel, PowerPoint, 
Outlook, Internet Explorer)  Systems that run on a mainframe computer  Systems referred to as 
cloud or web based systems  Enterprise systems like SAP  IT support systems such as database, 
network, and application development    
 
You DO NOT work in any way with industrial control systems (ICS), SCADA systems, or 
manufacturing equipment such as PLCs.  
 
Operational Technology (OT) Identity  
You must be an authorized user at the place where you work. This means you have been given 
credentials to access proprietary computer systems that are not available to the public.  
 
You WORK PRIMARILY with industrial control systems (ICS), SCADA systems or 
manufacturing equipment such as PLCs, which are used to control industrial processes by 
monitoring and independently changing the state of a process.  
 
Examples of industrial control systems you might work with include (but are not limited to):   
Siemens  Emerson  Honeywell  GE  Rockwell    
 
You might have access to information  systems to monitor or record data, access email, or 
browse the Internet, but this is not your primary work function.  Examples of information 
systems you might use in support of your job, but not the primary focus of your job, include:   
Personal Computer (PC) based systems such as Microsoft Office (Word, Excel, PowerPoint, 
Outlook, Internet Explorer)  Systems that run on a mainframe computer  Systems referred to as 
cloud or web based systems  Enterprise systems like SAP  IT support systems such as database, 
network, and programming tools 
 
 YES, I wish to continue with this survey. (1) 
 NO, I wish to exit this survey. (2) 
Condition: NO, I wish to exit this sur... Is Selected. Skip To: End of Block. 
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Q3 During this study, you will be asked to answer questions associated with a 
comprehensive computer security policy.      
 
For purpose of this study, a comprehensive computer security policy is defined as a top-level 
enterprise policy combining all aspects of information technology (IT) computer security and 
operational technology (OT) computer security,  as opposed to focusing on only one or the 
other.        
 
The concept of merging all aspects of IT computer security which is focused on information 
systems computer security, with all aspects of OT computer security which is focused on 
industrial control systems computer security, is sometimes referred to as IT/OT convergence and 
reflects a comprehensive or holistic approach to managing computer security.  This differs from 
the traditional definition of a computer security policy that only includes aspects of computer 
security from the IT domain, as this definition also includes aspects of computer security from 
the OT domain.        
 
The intent behind managing computer security from a comprehensive perspective is to minimize 
the non-malicious computer security actions of all authorized users across the enterprise, as 
opposed to focusing on only one domain or the other.      
 
As such, a comprehensive computer security policy gathers all aspects of computer security into 
a single, overarching policy that binds all authorized users in the enterprise to a common cause; 
being accountable for their computer security actions regardless of whether or not an authorized 
user identifies as IT or OT. 
 
 YES, I wish to continue with this survey. (1) 
 NO, I wish to exit this survey. (2) 
Condition: NO, I wish to exit this sur... Is Selected. Skip To: End of Block. 
 
Q4 Beginning of survey. 
 
There are 36 questions in this survey, numbered 0 through 35. 
 
For purpose of this survey, imagine that a comprehensive computer security policy has been 
implemented at your place of work.  Please answer each question from your perspective as either 
an Information Technology (IT) authorized user or an Operational Technology (OT) authorized 
user. 
 
Click the forward button after answering each question, to move to the next page. 
Click the back button if you wish to review the previous page. 
 
 YES, I wish to continue with this survey. (1) 
 NO, I wish to exit this survey. (2) 
Condition: NO, I wish to exit this sur... Is Selected. Skip To: End of Block. 
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Q5 Question 0 
As an authorized user, I identify myself as: 
 
 Information Technology (IT) identity (I work primarily with information systems that 
support general organizational processes) (1) 
 Operational Technology (OT) identity (I work primarily with industrial control systems, 
SCADA systems, PLCs, etc.) (2) 
 I am not an authorized user (3) 
Condition: I am not an authorized user Is Selected. Skip To: End of Block. 
 
Q6 Question 1 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
Disagree 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
(3) 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree (5) 
Agree (6) Strongly 
agree (7) 
My 
coworkers 
agree that 
I should 
comply 
with the 
new 
policy. (1) 
              
 
 
Q7 Question 2 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
Disagree 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
(3) 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree (5) 
Agree (6) Strongly 
agree (7) 
My 
coworkers 
will think 
that I 
should 
comply 
with the 
new 
computer 
security 
policy. (1) 
              
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Q8 Question 3 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
Disagree 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
(3) 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree (5) 
Agree (6) Strongly 
agree (7) 
My 
supervisor 
will want 
me to 
comply 
with this 
new 
policy. (1) 
              
 
 
Q9 Question 4 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
Disagree 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
(3) 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree (5) 
Agree (6) Strongly 
agree (7) 
It is 
important 
that I 
convince 
my 
coworkers 
to comply 
with the 
new 
computer 
security 
policy. (1) 
              
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Q10 Question 5 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
Disagree 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
(3) 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree (5) 
Agree (6) Strongly 
agree (7) 
My 
coworkers 
rely on 
my 
opinion. 
(1) 
              
 
 
Q11 Question 6 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
Disagree 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
(3) 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree (5) 
Agree (6) Strongly 
agree (7) 
The new 
policy is 
important 
and 
others 
need to 
know 
how I feel 
about it. 
(1) 
              
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Q12 Question 7 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
Disagree 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
(3) 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree (5) 
Agree (6) Strongly 
agree (7) 
I will be 
reprimanded 
if my 
organization 
is aware of 
my non-
secure 
actions. (1) 
              
 
 
Q13 Question 8 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
Disagree 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
(3) 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree (5) 
Agree (6) Strongly 
agree (7) 
My 
management 
notices 
when I 
follow 
security 
procedures, 
and 
encourages 
me to keep 
doing a good 
job! (1) 
              
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Q14 Question 9 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
Disagree 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
(3) 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree (5) 
Agree (6) Strongly 
agree (7) 
I am 
encouraged 
when the 
company 
notices I 
am 
following 
security 
procedures. 
(1) 
              
 
 
Q15 Question 10 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
Disagree 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
(3) 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree (5) 
Agree (6) Strongly 
agree (7) 
As a 
professional, 
I have to do 
certain 
things on 
my job. 
Strictly 
following 
computer 
security 
policies is 
one of 
them. (1) 
              
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Q16 Question 11 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
Disagree 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
(3) 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree (5) 
Agree (6) Strongly 
agree (7) 
Following 
computer 
security 
rules and 
policies is an 
important 
part of what 
do as a 
professional. 
(1) 
              
 
 
Q17 Question 12 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
Disagree 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
(3) 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree (5) 
Agree (6) Strongly 
agree (7) 
Breaking 
security 
policies 
hurts my 
image as a 
professional. 
(1) 
              
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Q18 Question 13 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
Disagree 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
(3) 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree (5) 
Agree (6) Strongly 
agree (7) 
This 
security 
policy 
helps to 
secure all 
computer 
systems. 
(1) 
              
 
 
Q19 Question 14 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
Disagree 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
(3) 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree (5) 
Agree (6) Strongly 
agree (7) 
This 
security 
policy is 
absolutely 
necessary. 
(1) 
              
 
 
Q20 Question 15 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
Disagree 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
(3) 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree (5) 
Agree (6) Strongly 
agree (7) 
This 
security 
policy is 
important. 
(1) 
              
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Q21 Question 16 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
Disagree 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
(3) 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree (5) 
Agree (6) Strongly 
agree (7) 
I understand 
the risks 
posed by 
poor 
security and 
that I may 
be 
reprimanded 
if I don't 
comply with 
policy. (1) 
              
 
 
Q22 Question 17 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
Disagree 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
(3) 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree (5) 
Agree (6) Strongly 
agree (7) 
I am aware of 
the potential 
threats and 
negative 
consequences 
that are 
possible if I 
don't follow 
the proper 
security 
procedures. 
(1) 
              
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Q23 Question 18 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
Disagree 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
(3) 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree (5) 
Agree (6) Strongly 
agree (7) 
It is 
important 
that I follow 
the rules for 
keeping my 
organization 
secure so 
that I don't 
get into 
trouble. (1) 
              
 
 
Q24 Question 19 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
Disagree 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
(3) 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree (5) 
Agree (6) Strongly 
agree (7) 
My co-
workers 
and I 
agree 
that 
complying 
with the 
new 
policy is 
the right 
thing to 
do. (1) 
              
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Q25 Question 20 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
Disagree 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
(3) 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree (5) 
Agree (6) Strongly 
agree (7) 
It is 
important 
to me 
that my 
co-
workers 
comply 
with the 
new 
policy. (1) 
              
 
 
Q26 Question 21 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
Disagree 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
(3) 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree (5) 
Agree (6) Strongly 
agree (7) 
It is 
important 
that my 
co-
workers 
know 
that I 
intend to 
comply 
with the 
new 
computer 
security 
policy. (1) 
              
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Q27 Question 22 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
Disagree 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
(3) 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree (5) 
Agree (6) Strongly 
agree (7) 
I believe 
that 
complying 
with the 
new 
security 
policy is a 
good 
idea. (1) 
              
 
 
Q28 Question 23 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
Disagree 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
(3) 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree (5) 
Agree (6) Strongly 
agree (7) 
I think 
that 
complying 
with the 
new 
security 
policy is 
the right 
thing to 
do. (1) 
              
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Q29 Question 24 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
Disagree 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
(3) 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree (5) 
Agree (6) Strongly 
agree (7) 
By 
complying 
with the 
new 
security 
policy I 
am 
helping 
the 
company 
stay 
secure 
from 
computer 
threats. 
(1) 
              
 
 
Q30 Question 25 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
Disagree 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
(3) 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree (5) 
Agree (6) Strongly 
agree (7) 
Complying 
with the new 
policy helps 
to improve 
my job 
performance. 
(1) 
              
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Q31 Question 26 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
Disagree 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
(3) 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree (5) 
Agree (6) Strongly 
agree (7) 
Complying 
with the 
new policy 
lets me 
perform 
my tasks 
more 
effectively. 
(1) 
              
 
 
Q32 Question 27 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
Disagree 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
(3) 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree (5) 
Agree (6) Strongly 
agree (7) 
Complying 
with the 
new 
policy 
makes it 
easier for 
me to do 
my job. 
(1) 
              
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Q33 Question 28 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
Disagree 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
(3) 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree (5) 
Agree (6) Strongly 
agree (7) 
I am 
confident 
that I will 
comply 
with the 
new 
computer 
security 
policy. (1) 
              
 
 
Q34 Question 29 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
Disagree 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
(3) 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree (5) 
Agree (6) Strongly 
agree (7) 
I 
understand 
the 
benefits of 
the new 
computer 
security 
policy and I 
intend to 
comply 
with it. (1) 
              
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Q35 Question 30 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
Disagree 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
(3) 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree (5) 
Agree (6) Strongly 
agree (7) 
Regardless 
of how 
others 
think or 
act, I 
intend to 
comply 
with the 
new 
computer 
security 
policy. (1) 
              
 
 
Q36 Question 31 
 
My age (round to nearest year): 
 Less than 18 years old (1) 
 18 to 24 years old (2) 
 25 to 34 years old (3) 
 35 to 44 years old (4) 
 45 to 54 years old (5) 
 55 to 64 years old (6) 
 65 years or older (7) 
 
Q37 Question 32 
 
My gender: 
 Male (1) 
 Female (2) 
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Q38 Question 33 
 
The highest level of education that I have completed: 
 Some high school, but no diploma (1) 
 High school diploma or equivalent (GED) (2) 
 Some college credit, but no degree (3) 
 Trade/technical/vocational certificate (4) 
 Associate's degree (5) 
 Bachelor's degree (6) 
 Some graduate school work, but no graduate degree (7) 
 Master's degree (8) 
 Doctorate degree (9) 
 
Q39 Question 34 
 
My total years of experience as an authorized user (round to closest year, regardless of IT/OT 
identity): 
 Less than 1 year (1) 
 1 to 5 years (2) 
 6 to 10 years (3) 
 11 to 15 years (4) 
 16 to 20 years (5) 
 21 to 25 years (6) 
 26 to 30 years (7) 
 31 to 35 years (8) 
 36 years or more (9) 
 
Q40 Question 35 
 
The industry sector that I currently work in: 
 Extraction of natural resources (e.g. agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining, drilling, etc.) (1) 
 Transformation of natural resources (e.g. manufacturing, construction, energy, refining, etc.) 
(2) 
 Physical service provider (e.g. transportation, distribution, wholesale, retail, government, 
etc.) (3) 
 Knowledge based service provider (e.g. information technology, education, media, 
consulting, etc.) (4) 
 
Q41 End of survey. 
 
Thank you for your participation!  
Please press the forward button to complete this survey. 
 
